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By enacting § 2 [of the Federal Arbitration Act] . . . Congress precluded 
States from singling out arbitration provisions for suspect status, requir-






Jamie Leigh Jones, a Halliburton employee working in Iraq, was 
drugged and gang-raped by her coworkers.2  When she sought justice 
in court, Halliburton argued that her sexual assault claims had to be 
arbitrated pursuant to a clause in her employment contract.3 
African American consumers alleging racial discrimination against 
a car dealership discover that they are each required to pay some 
$14,000 in fees up front just to have their less-than-$180,000 claims 
 
1 Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (quoting Scherk v. 
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)). 
2 James Risen, Limbo for U.S. Women Reporting Iraq Assaults, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 
2008, at A1. 
3 Id. at A10.  The Fifth Circuit recently held that Jones may bring her sexual ha-
rassment claims in court despite the agreement.  Jones v. Halliburton Co., 583 F.3d 
228, 242 (5th Cir. 2009).   
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heard in arbitration.4  Filing the same action in federal court would 
have cost them each $350.5 
The National Arbitration Forum (NAF), which until recently arbi-
trated debt-collection disputes between financial institutions and con-
sumers, earned “at least $5 million in fees between 1998 and 2000” 
from one such financial institution alone.6  In the same period, that 
financial institution allegedly won 99.6% of its 50,000 NAF cases.7 
These and other “arbitration horror stories”8 have fueled a pola-
rizing debate within academia, in legislatures, and among ordinary 
individuals—individuals who increasingly find themselves surrender-
ing their right to trial by jury just to obtain a job or basic services like a 
credit card or health care.  Some see in this development the ugly 
specter of predatory corporations herding the unwary into secret trials 
and “kangaroo court[s].”9  Others worry that latent prejudices about 
arbitration have produced exaggerated suspicions that are belied by a 
more complex and balanced reality.10 
In response to real or perceived abuses, state lawmakers have in-
creased their efforts to regulate arbitration.  After all, arbitration is a 
“creature of contract,”11 and states have been the primary stewards of 
contract law.  Thus, Nebraska requires form contracts containing a 
binding arbitration clause to provide a prominent disclosure of the 
 
4 JOHN O’DONNELL, PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE ARBITRATION TRAP:  HOW CREDIT CARD 
COMPANIES ENSNARE CONSUMERS 35 (2007), available at http://www.citizen.org/ 
documents/ArbitrationTrap.pdf.  These figures do not include attorneys’ fees. 
5 Id. at 36. 
6 Arbitration or “Arbitrary”:  The Misuse of Mandatory Arbitration to Collect Consumer 
Debts:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Policy of the H. Comm. on Oversight & 
Gov’t Reform, 111th Cong. 4 (2009) (statement of F. Paul Bland, Jr., Staff Attorney, 
Public Justice), available at http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/Hearings/ 
pdfs/20090722Bland.pdf. 
7 Id.  In July 2009, the Minnesota Attorney General’s Office filed a civil action 
against the NAF for fraud and deceptive practices, alleging that the NAF had a financial 
interest in some of these institutions, as well as in the law firms that represented them.  
See Complaint at 1-2, Minnesota v. Nat’l Arbitration Forum, Inc., No. 09-18550 (Minn. 
Dist. Ct. July 14, 2009), available at http://www.ag.state.mn.us/PDF/PressReleases/ 
SignedFiledComplaintArbitrationCompany.pdf (describing the NAF’s affiliations).   
8 See generally ARBITRATION HORROR STORIES, http://arbitrationhorrorstories. 
wordpress.com (last visited Feb. 15, 2011) (cataloguing similar incidents).  A casual 
perusal of the Internet reveals no shortage of similar forums.  
9 See In re Soto, 165 N.E.2d 855, 857 (N.Y. 1960) (Froessel, J., dissenting); John 
Vail, Big Business Acts the Bully, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 4, 2008, at 22. 
10 See, e.g., Thomas E. Carbonneau, “Arbitracide”:  The Story of Anti-Arbitration Senti-
ment in the U.S. Congress, 18 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 233, 253, 261-62 (2007).  
11 E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin Intermediates, 
S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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clause in capitalized, underlined letters.12  California refuses to enforce 
awards rendered by arbitrators who fail to disclose certain conflicts of 
interest.13  Kansas forbids predispute arbitration agreements between 
employers and employees.14  To some, these seem like reasonable mea-
sures that help level the playing field and protect vulnerable parties. 
According to the Supreme Court’s current jurisprudence, howev-
er, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)15 displaces almost all of these 
state initiatives under the doctrine of implied obstacle preemption.16  
The dominant explanation for this result is that the FAA’s purpose is 
to further the parties’ freedom of contract, by “rigorously en-
forc[ing]” arbitration clauses according to their terms.17  Given the 
supremacy of federal law, this interpretation of the FAA leaves state 
legislatures with precious little wiggle room to regulate such clauses, 
particularly in the “mandatory” binding arbitration area.  It results in 
the overpreemption of state law, which cynics attribute to “the Court’s 
 
12 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2602.02 (2008). 
13 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1281.9, 1286.2(a)(6)(A) (West 2007). 
14 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-401(c)(2) (2001). 
15 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006). 
16 According to David Schwartz, from January 2002 to April 2004, courts held that 
the FAA preempted almost fifty different state laws.  See David S. Schwartz, State Judges 
as Guardians of Federalism:  Resisting the Federal Arbitration Act’s Encroachment on State Law, 
16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 129 app. A (2004) [hereinafter Schwartz, State Judges].  
Schwartz estimates that, due to the effect of precedent, “[t]his [statistic] suggests that 
hundreds of state laws are held preempted each year.”  David S. Schwartz, The Federal 
Arbitration Act and the Power of Congress over State Courts, 83 OR. L. REV. 541, 549 n.29 
(2004) [hereinafter Schwartz, Power of Congress]. 
17 Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220-21 (1985); see also Julius 
Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 
277-78 (1926) (“The primary purpose of the [FAA] is to make enforceable in the Fed-
eral courts such agreements for arbitration . . . .”); Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense 
of Southland:  Reexamining the Legislative History of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 101, 102 (2002) (“In Southland, the Court effectively ‘federalized’ United 
States arbitration law, ‘restrict[ing] state legislative rights’ so as ‘to guarantee the un-
obstructed enforcement of arbitration agreements.’” (quoting THOMAS E. CARBON-
NEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION 162 (2d ed. 
2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Stephen L. Hayford, Federal Preemption and 
Vacatur:  The Bookend Issues Under the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 
67, 71 (explaining that “the enforcement of contractual agreements to arbitrate” is the 
“seminal purpose of the FAA”); Stephen J. Ware, Punitive Damages in Arbitration:  Con-
tracting Out of Government’s Role in Punishment and Federal Preemption of State Law, 63 
FORDHAM L. REV. 529, 571 (1994) (“A state law that limits freedom of contract with 
respect to arbitration agreements conflicts with the FAA and is preempted by it.”). 
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own self-interested goal of reducing the number of cases pending in 
the federal courts.”18 
At the same time, the dominant view leaves the door ajar for 
judges to police arbitration agreements through standard contract law 
defenses to enforceability.  For this reason, state courts have been 
viewed as “guardians” against the FAA’s relentless colonization of state 
law domains.19  But empirical and anecdotal evidence increasingly 
suggests that those courts may have started taking the offensive, by dis-
torting easily manipulable rules such as the unconscionability doctrine 
in order to accomplish the very same regulation of arbitration agree-
ments that the FAA appears to have declared off-limits to state legisla-
tures.20  Because the prevailing view is that established rules of con-
tract do not offend the FAA as long as they “arose to govern issues 
concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts 
generally,”21 such judicial maneuvering has largely managed to fly un-
der the radar.  Ironically, this leaves existing FAA preemption 
jurisprudence prone to the opposite charge of underpreemption. 
In this Article, I seek to inject a fresh perspective on these prob-
lems.  Rather than a “broad principle of enforceability”22 for arbitra-
tion clauses, I argue that the Court’s FAA preemption jurisprudence 
reflects a core principle of nondiscrimination in enforcement.  On this 
view, the central purpose of FAA preemption is to reverse what is per-
ceived to be the law’s longstanding yet irrational hostility toward arbi-
tration.  That hostility manifested itself—and, according to the Court, 
continues to manifest itself—in legal rules that deny arbitration 
agreements the equal opportunity of enforcement enjoyed by other 
contracts.23  Countless lower courts and commentators have likewise 
grasped the anti-discrimination logic of FAA preemption.24  But none 
 
18 Larry J. Pittman, The Federal Arbitration Act:  The Supreme Court’s Erroneous Statutory 
Interpretation, Stare Decisis, and a Proposal for Change, 53 ALA. L. REV. 789, 830 (2002); see 
also Casarotto v. Lombardi (Lombardi I), 886 P.2d 931, 941 (Mont. 1994) (Trieweiler, 
J., specially concurring), vacated, 515 U.S. 1129 (1995); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or 
Corporate Tool?:  Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 637, 661 (1996). 
19 See, e.g., Schwartz, State Judges, supra note 16, at 143-47. 
20 See infra notes 207-09 and accompanying text. 
21 Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987). 
22 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11 (1984). 
23 See H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924); see also Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Car-
degna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006) (“To overcome judicial resistance to arbitration, Con-
gress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act . . . [which] places arbitration agreements on 
equal footing with all other contracts . . . .” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). 
24 See infra notes 177-85 and accompanying text. 
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has ventured beyond the occasional, one-line reference to the FAA as 
an “anti-discrimination statute”25 or as a “a sort of ‘equal protection’ 
clause for arbitration provisions”26 in order to explain the meaning 
behind that logic. 
This is the first of two articles in which I attempt to fill this void.27  
To be clear, the anti-discrimination theory of FAA preemption that I 
seek to defend is grounded primarily in the Court’s jurisprudence ra-
ther than in the FAA itself.  Although anti-discrimination themes are 
certainly evident in the text and history of the statute, the language of 
the FAA is simply too indeterminate, and the congressional record 
leading to its enactment too sparse, to draw any firm conclusions about 
its original meaning.  There is also considerable doubt as to whether 
Congress ever intended the FAA to preempt state substantive law (ra-
ther than simply to provide rules for the streamlined enforcement of 
arbitration agreements in federal court).28  What is undeniable, how-
ever, is that courts routinely deploy the rhetoric of anti-discrimination 
when justifying the FAA’s displacement of state law.  My approach is 
therefore to interrogate those justifications and to question whether 
they necessitate the outcomes the Court tells us they do. 
Unlike the dominant view, an anti-discrimination approach would 
not require the preemption of all state legislation restricting the use 
of arbitration agreements.  From an anti-discrimination perspective, 
even laws that facially discriminate against certain historically op-
pressed groups are not always problematic.  This is captured by the 
well-known concept of a “suspect” or “quasi-suspect” classification in 
equal protection law.  Such classifications are suspicious because we 
have good reason to fear the persistence of hostility and prejudice.  
But the fact that they are “suspect” rather than “forbidden” means 
that those classifications may sometimes be tolerated where necessary 
to serve overriding public interests.  Similarly, an anti-discrimination-
inspired model of FAA preemption would displace state law only if the 
law could be said to discriminate improperly against arbitration—that 
 
25 Joshua Ratner & Christian Turner, Origin, Scope, and Irrevocability of the Manifest 
Disregard of the Law Doctrine:  Second Circuit Views, 24 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 795, 797-98 
(2006). 
26 David Ling, Preserving Fairness in Arbitration Agreements:  States’ Options after Casa-
rotto, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 193, 193 (1997). 
27 The companion piece is Hiro N. Aragaki, Equal Opportunity for Arbitration, 58 
U.C.L.A. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (on file with author).  
28 See infra notes 210-13 and accompanying text.  
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is, if it betrayed the same anti-arbitration bias or “mistrust” of the 
arbitral process that the FAA was designed to abolish.29 
But anti-discrimination law also understands that discrimination 
operates in subtle ways; just because a law is general on its face does not 
mean it cannot do harm as applied.  Anti-discrimination law has accor-
dingly developed a number of evidentiary frameworks to distinguish be-
tween the legitimate and pretextual applications of facially neutral laws.  
I argue that similar frameworks, when adapted to the FAA context, may 
help address the concerns of those who fear the advent of a “new judi-
cial hostility”30 in the way that some courts seem to use the unconscio-
nability defense against arbitration agreements. 
Disillusionment with the Court’s strong pro-arbitration leanings 
has understandably led some to elide the anti-discrimination under-
pinnings of FAA preemption.  But it leads me rather to highlight those 
underpinnings for two reasons.  First, as a descriptive matter, anti-
discrimination is the organizing principle that best explains the 
Court’s FAA preemption jurisprudence over the past twenty-five years.  
We are stuck with this jurisprudence; instead of fighting it or wishing 
it away, advocates on both ends of the political spectrum would do 
better to lay bare its true meaning.  Second, even if the assumptions 
behind the principle are no longer appropriate, the Court and lower 
courts continue to rely on a norm of anti-discrimination to legitimize 
the FAA’s preemptive compass.  I argue that a more sophisticated en-
gagement with that norm offers a way to lend integrity to the law of 
FAA preemption, by holding courts to the full implications of their 
own pronouncements. 
This Article proceeds as follows:  In Part I, I offer an account of 
certain basic features of the Court’s FAA preemption jurisprudence 
to set the stage for my broader normative claims.  In Part II, I argue 
that the deeper logic of the Court’s FAA jurisprudence (including its 
FAA preemption jurisprudence) is not one of enforcing arbitration 
agreements as written, but rather of ensuring that state laws do not 
improperly discriminate against arbitration.  I explain why that juris-
prudence implicitly regards any classification that disadvantages 
 
29 Cf. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 231-32 (1987); Ste-
phen L. Hayford & Alan R. Palmiter, Arbitration Federalism:  A State Role in Commercial 
Arbitration, 54 FLA. L. REV. 175, 194-95 (2002). 
30 See Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration:  Federal Preemption, 
Contract Unconscionability, and Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 469, 483. 
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arbitration as “suspect,” and thus why arbitration itself deserves a 
kind of “suspect” status.31 
When viewed through an anti-discrimination lens, the Court’s 
FAA preemption jurisprudence appears both too restrictive and too 
permissive.  I argue in Part III that it is too restrictive because it 
assumes that a state law impermissibly discriminates simply because it 
singles out arbitration on its face.  In Part IV, I argue that it is too 
permissive:  it does not go far enough to protect arbitration because it 
is too aloof to the problem of discrimination in application. 
My contention emphatically is not that arbitration agreements 
should be considered a “suspect” or “quasi-suspect” class under equal 
protection law.  Nor is it my purpose to vindicate an independent de-
scriptive claim about the existence of discrimination against arbitra-
tion or to develop substantive rules for remedying any such discrimi-
nation.  Rather, it is to borrow from the more refined conceptual 
resources developed in the anti-discrimination area to introduce a 
more sophisticated way of thinking about FAA preemption.  In doing 
so, I hope to lay the foundations for an alternative approach, one that 
helps restore a balance between the states’ legitimate regulatory inter-
ests and the so-called “national policy favoring arbitration.”32 
 
31 In using the term “suspect,” I do not intend to suggest a particular correspon-
dence with the notion of a “suspect” class or a “quasi-suspect” class, or with the degree 
of suspicion (or scrutiny) that they trigger. 
 Note also that my use of the term “suspect” is slightly different from the term “sus-
pect status” in the quotation from the Court’s seminal Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarot-
to opinion with which this Article began.  See supra note 1 and accompanying text.  The 
Court in that case appears to say that state judges and legislatures should not regard 
arbitration agreements as suspicious simply because they are arbitration agreements.  
Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687-88 (1996).  By contrast, I use the 
phrase to suggest that we should regard any state law to be suspicious if it purposefully 
disadvantages arbitration agreements.  Although this does not appear to be the way 
most courts and commentators have understood the Court’s phrase, some have also 
used the term “suspect” in this way.  See, e.g., 2 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBI-
TRATION LAW § 16.2.4 (Supp. 1999) (referring to the Court’s anti-arbitration holding 
in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953), as “suspect” because it rested on “outmoded 
hostility”); Thomas H. Riske, No Exceptions:  How the Legitimate Business Justification for 
Unconscionability Only Further Demonstrates California Courts’ Disdain for Arbitration Agree-
ments, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 591, 603 (describing a court’s unconscionability finding 
against an arbitration agreement as “suspect” because it betrayed a “general prejudice 
against arbitration”). 
32 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). 
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I.  THE EXISTING FAA PREEMPTION PARADIGM 
The Court’s FAA preemption jurisprudence is based entirely on 
section 2 of the FAA,33 which provides, in pertinent part:  “A written 
provision . . . to submit [specified disputes] to arbitration . . . shall be 
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at 
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”34  In a series of 
decisions culminating in Southland Corp. v. Keating, the Court crystal-
lized its interpretation of section 2 as a substantive provision falling 
within Congress’s broad power to regulate interstate commerce.35 
As substantive federal legislation, section 2 has the potential to 
displace state law in one of several ways.  Under the doctrine of 
federal preemption, section 2 would preclude the states from legisl-
ating in a particular area if (a) Congress had made this intention 
explicit in the text of the FAA or (b) Congress’s intention to occupy 
the field could be inferred from a comprehensive scheme of federal 
legislation that leaves little room for concurrent state lawmaking.36  
Neither, however, is the case for section 2.37  The only remaining 
ground for displacing state law is therefore the Supremacy Clause,38 
pursuant to which federal law trumps any state provision that conflicts 
with or “‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution 
of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’”39  Technically 
speaking, this displacement is not a species of preemption at all but 
rather of supremacy.40  Nonetheless, it is colloquially referred to as 
“conflict” or “obstacle” preemption, and it is also the way in which the 
Court finds FAA section 2 to “preempt” state law. 
The Court has developed an analytical framework for determining 
when FAA section 2 preempts conflicting state laws.  I shall refer to 
this framework as the “Paradigm.”  Christopher Drahozal has provided 
 
33 See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 447 (2006) (describ-
ing FAA section 2 as “the only [FAA] provision that we have applied in state court”). 
34 United States Arbitration Act § 2, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
35 See Southland, 465 U.S. at 11; see also Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury 
Contr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 
395, 405 (1967). 
36 See Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 606-07 (1991); Stephen A. 
Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 775 (1994). 
37 See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 
468, 477 (1989). 
38 U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
39 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000) (quoting Hines v. 
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
40 See Gardbaum, supra note 36, at 768-69. 
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perhaps the most comprehensive account of the Paradigm to date.41  
My goal in this Part is to present an abbreviated account of the 
Paradigm that serves less as an alternative to Drahozal’s than as a 
foundation for this Article’s broader normative argument. 
My account of the Paradigm is subject to the following simplifying 
assumptions.  First, I define the Paradigm as limited to section 2 
preemption, thereby excluding consideration of other substantive 
provisions of the FAA that the Court may later find to have preempt-
ive force.42  Second, because they are tangential to my argument, I set 
aside cases in which the parties have specifically selected state law to 
govern their arbitration agreement.43  Third, in order to focus on the 
Paradigm’s foundational building blocks, I assume that the universe of 
state laws consists only of those that unproblematically fit into one of 
the Paradigm’s binary categories:  laws that either single out arbi-
tration or apply to “any contract.”44  Finally, in this Part only, I intend 
my account of the Paradigm to be a descriptive explanation of how I 
believe most courts (following the Supreme Court’s lead) construe 
and apply FAA preemption doctrine, rather than to suggest how the 
Paradigm should operate. 
A.  Enforcement-Neutral and Enforcement-Impeding Laws 
FAA section 2 provides that any arbitration agreement falling 
within its jurisdictional purview “shall be valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable.”45  A threshold requirement for preemption based on 
section 2, therefore, is that the state law frustrate this imperative of 
enforceability, either in whole or in part.46  I refer to such laws as 
 
41 See Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393, 
407-19 (2004) (providing a four-step analysis for FAA preemption). 
42 Thus, when I say that the FAA preempts a state law, I mean that FAA section 2 
preempts the law. 
43 In these circumstances, the chosen state law is generally saved from FAA 
preemption.  See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 
U.S. 468, 479 (1989).  But see Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 
52, 63-64 (1995) (holding that the parties’ choice of New York law did include that 
state’s law prohibiting punitive damage awards in arbitration).   
44 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).  This is a crucial limiting assumption of the Article.  State 
laws that do not fit into those categories have posed some of the most perplexing FAA 
preemption problems.  Accord Drahozal, supra note 41, at 425.  Precisely how an anti-
discrimination model of FAA preemption would contend with such state laws is an im-
portant question that I take up in Equal Opportunity for Arbitration, supra note 27.   
45 9 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added). 
46 See, e.g., Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 356 (2008) (noting that a state law is in 
conflict with the FAA even when it merely “imposes prerequisites to enforcement of an 
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“enforcement impeding.”47  By contrast, a state law that does not stand 
as an obstacle to the enforceability of arbitration agreements is never 
preempted by section 2, even if the law encumbers arbitration in 
other ways.48  I refer to such laws as “enforcement neutral.” 
Many—but not all—procedural and ethical rules regulating the 
practice of arbitration (as opposed to contracts of arbitration) are 
enforcement neutral.49  For example, a state law that provides for the 
immediate appeal of an order to compel arbitration may burden the 
arbitration process by creating further opportunities for delay.  But 
delay alone has been insufficient to trigger FAA preemption 
concerns.50  Because such a law does not frustrate (wholly or partially) 
the enforceability of an otherwise valid arbitration agreement, it is 
enforcement neutral and therefore not subject to preemption by the 
FAA.51  On the other hand, a state procedural rule that requires 
arbitrators to disclose conflicts of interest would be enforcement 
 
arbitration agreement”); Drahozal, supra note 41, at 408 (arguing that a state law that 
“invalidate[s] the parties’ arbitration agreement, in whole or in part, conditionally or un-
conditionally” is preempted); Stephen J. Ware, “Opt-In” for Judicial Review of Errors of Law 
Under the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 263, 269 (1997) (“If one 
cannot imagine an arbitration agreement that might be rendered unenforceable by the 
state law, then one can be nearly certain that the state law safely avoids preemption.”). 
47 This definition includes state laws that restrict the enforceability of arbitral 
awards beyond the standards for vacatur contained in FAA section 10.  Such laws are 
enforcement impeding because they provide an indirect avenue for limiting FAA sec-
tion 2.  See infra note 52 and accompanying text. 
48 See Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996) (explaining that 
a state law that “d[oes] not affect the enforceability of the arbitration agreement itself ” 
would be consistent with the FAA).  But see Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 
1114, 1121 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that the FAA preempted a state statute that did not 
restrict the enforceability of arbitration clauses in securities contracts but only imposed 
sanctions upon broker-dealers).  
49 See, e.g., New Eng. Energy Inc. v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1, 4-7 (1st Cir. 
1988) (finding no preemption of a state law providing for consolidation of related arbi-
tration proceedings); St. Fleur v. WPI Cable Sys./Mutron, 879 N.E.2d 27, 33-34 (Mass. 
2008) (finding no preemption of a procedural rule withholding the right to a jury for 
factual determinations on a motion to compel arbitration); Wells v. Chevy Chase Bank, 
F.S.B., 768 A.2d 620, 629 (Md. 2001) (finding no preemption of a general appeals statute 
that provided a right of immediate appeal from an order compelling arbitration).   
50 See, e.g., Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 688; Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 
213, 219 (1985) (“We . . . reject the suggestion that the overriding goal of the Arbitra-
tion Act was to promote the expeditious resolution of claims.”). 
51 Note, however, that such a state law may conflict with FAA section 16, which 
provides that an appeal may not be taken from an order granting a motion to compel 
arbitration.  To reiterate, I take no position on the preemption of state law by FAA sec-
tions other than section 2.  See supra note 42 and accompanying text.  
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impeding, and hence a candidate for preemption, if it provides that 
awards rendered in violation of the rule are unenforceable.52 
Enforcement-impeding laws can take one of several forms.  The 
first is a statute that unconditionally invalidates an arbitration agree-
ment or some part thereof, such as an Alabama statute that makes all 
written predispute arbitration agreements unenforceable53 or the so-
called Garrity rule in New York, which prohibits arbitrators from 
awarding punitive damages.54 
The second is a law that makes the validity of an arbitration 
agreement contingent on compliance with certain requirements.  
Prime examples are laws that render arbitration clauses unenforceable 
unless the clause is somehow brought to the nondrafting party’s 
attention—for instance, by requiring the clause to be written in capital 
letters next to the signature block of the container contract.55  Such 
statutes do not necessarily invalidate arbitration agreements, only 
those that do not comply with the statute’s requirements. 
The third type of enforcement-impeding law is one that merely 
impairs agreements as to the time, place, or manner of arbitration.56  
For example, many states have enacted statutes voiding out-of-state 
forum selection clauses or class action waivers, whether in arbitration 
or litigation.57  Assuming severability, such laws do not prevent the 
arbitration itself from going forward.  Even though they may not 
 
52 See Skinner v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., No. 03-2625, 2003 WL 
23174478, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2003) (observing that state laws “allow[ing] the 
court to vacate arbitral awards entered upon the agreements of the parties is 
preempted by the FAA”); Richard C. Reuben, Personal Autonomy and Vacatur After Hall 
Street, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1103, 1156 (2009) (observing that state procedural rules, 
such as those relating to vacatur of arbitral awards, would survive preemption so long 
as they do not “contravene the enforcement provisions of Section 2 of the FAA”).  But 
see Ovitz v. Schulman, 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 117, 134-35 (Ct. App. 2005) (holding that Cali-
fornia’s arbitrator disclosure rules do not affect enforceability because “[i]f an award is 
vacated, the result is not a preclusion of further arbitration, but rather a new arbitra-
tion held in accordance with the disclosure requirements”).  
53 ALA. CODE § 8-1-41(3) (1993), preemption recognized by Allied-Bruce Terminix 
Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 278-81 (1995).  
54 See Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793, 795-96 (N.Y. 1976), superseded by 
statute as recognized in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 59-
60 (1995). 
55 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2602.02 (2008), preemption recognized by Affiliated 
Foods Midwest Coop., Inc. v. Integrated Distrib. Solutions, LLC, 460 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 
1073-74 (D. Neb. 2006). 
56 Drahozal refers to such laws as “second generation” state laws.  See Drahozal, su-
pra note 41, at 416. 
57 See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 20040.5 (West Supp. 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§ 19-28.1-14 (1998). 
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directly conflict with the imperative of enforceability contained in 
FAA section 2, such laws have nonetheless been deemed a sufficient 
“obstacle” to that imperative so as to warrant preemption by the FAA.58 
B.  The Single-Out/General Test 
Assuming an enforcement-impeding law, the next step in the 
preemption analysis is to inquire into the manner in which arbitration 
is treated on the face of the statute.  The Court has developed a 
binary, on/off framework for this analysis.  At one pole are “grounds 
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”59  Good 
examples are rules of contract formation,60 established contract 
defenses such as unconscionability, and other “generally applicable”61 
principles such as estoppel.62  Under current FAA preemption 
jurisprudence, such laws generally survive preemption.63 
 
58 See Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1136, 1148 (9th Cir. 2003); Bradley v. Harris 
Research, Inc., 275 F.3d 884, 890 (9th Cir. 2001); cf. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 
539 U.S. 444, 458-60 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that a state court 
rule imposing class arbitration where the agreement was silent on the issue should be 
preempted).  
59 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
60 See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995). 
61 Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686-87 (1996). 
62 See, e.g., Levitan v. Fanfare Media Works, Inc., No. B156337, 2003 WL 21028339, 
at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. May 8, 2003). 
63 The Court has stated that “if [a] law arose to govern issues concerning the valid-
ity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally,” it is not preempted.  Perry 
v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987).  And as I explain in Section IV.A, lower 
courts routinely deny preemption challenges predicated on the allegedly more strin-
gent application of general contract law doctrines to arbitration agreements.  See infra 
notes 312-15 and accompanying text.  Only a handful of courts have found the FAA to 
preempt certain applications of the unconscionability defense.  See, e.g., Wince v. Eas-
terbrooke Cellular Corp., 681 F. Supp. 2d 679, 685-86 (N.D. W. Va. 2010); Shubert v. 
Wells Fargo Auto Fin., Inc., No. 08-3754, 2008 WL 5451021, at *7 (D.N.J. Dec. 31, 
2008); Weinstein v. AT&T Mobility Corp., No. 07-2880, 2008 WL 1914754, at *5 (E.D. 
Pa. Apr. 30, 2008); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Coe, 313 F. Supp. 2d 
603, 615 (S.D. W. Va. 2004); Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 393, 
407-08 (Ct. App. 2003), rev’d, 113 P.3d 1100 (2005).  After Homa v. American Express Co., 
558 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2009), the foregoing decisions from within the Third Circuit are 
no longer good law. 
 There is some debate as to whether the Paradigm actually preempts (or would 
preempt) the “hostile” application of general contract laws.  The Court has suggested, 
for instance, that lower courts may not “rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to ar-
bitrate as a basis for a state-law holding that enforcement would be unconscionable.”  
Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9; see also Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687 n.3 (emphasizing the prin-
ciple from Perry).  This statement, however, is dictum because the issue in Perry was 
whether the FAA preempted a state statute, not the unconscionability defense.  Perry, 
482 U.S. at 489-91.  The Court has also stated that judges may not “decide that a con-
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There has been some uncertainty as to how “general” a law must be 
in order to escape preemption under this standard.  Many comment-
ators have taken the position that the state rule must apply to “all” 
contracts.64  According to this view, only state contract law would appear 
to avoid preemption.  Others have wondered whether a law would be 
considered general enough as long as it applied on its face to 
arbitration agreements and at least one other type of agreement.65 
Although the Court may soon address this issue,66 the majority 
view in the lower courts is that to avoid preemption, the state law must 
be basic enough that it extends to literally “all contracts.”67  Thus, state 
 
tract is fair enough to enforce all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair 
enough to enforce its arbitration clause.”  Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 
513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995).  But this, too, was dictum because Allied-Bruce did not involve 
a preemption challenge to a contract defense but rather to a statute that singled out 
arbitration.  Id. at 281-82.  This leads me to conclude that, in its current form, the Pa-
radigm does not clearly require the preemption of native contract law when the law is 
applied in a manner that discriminates against arbitration. 
 The Court may change this landscape in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, which was 
argued in November 2010.  See Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 
2009), cert. granted sub nom. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 130 S. Ct. 3322 (2010) 
(No. 09-0893). 
64 See, e.g., Drahozal, supra note 41, at 408-09 (highlighting the problem of forum-
selection laws that neither single out arbitration nor apply generally to “all contracts”); 
Hayford, supra note 17, at 78 (observing that the FAA preempts state laws “that do not 
apply equally to all contracts”); Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 29, at 213-14 (observing 
that the FAA does not preempt “state law standards applied in determining the validity 
of all contracts”); Margaret L. Moses, Privatized “Justice,” 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 535, 541 
(2005) (“[T]he Court’s position is that for grounds to be available to render an arbi-
tration provision unenforceable, such grounds must be . . . potentially applicable to all 
contracts.”); Stephen J. Ware, Contractual Arbitration, Mandatory Arbitration, and State 
Constitutional Jury-Trial Rights, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 39, 47 (2003) (rescinding the author’s 
earlier claim that a law would not have to apply “literally, [to] all contracts” to be 
deemed “general”).  But see 1 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW 
§ 10.7.2 (Supp. 1999) (defining “general contract law” as anything that is not state arbi-
tration law); Schwartz, Power of Congress, supra note 16, at 570 n.114 (“Clearly, it is over-
selling the point to suggest that ‘any contract’ plainly means ‘all contracts.’”); Jean R. 
Sternlight, The Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration as a Substitute for the Jury Trial, 38 
U.S.F. L. REV. 17, 36-37 (2003) (arguing that a law is “general” enough to be protected 
from preemption even if it “do[es] not apply generally to all kinds of contracts in a 
given state”).    
65 See 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 64, § 10.7.2. 
66 In Concepcion, the petitioner argued that California’s unconscionability test for 
collective action waivers should be preempted because it does not literally apply to all 
clauses, just clauses relating to dispute resolution.  Brief for Petitioner at 3, 17, 31, 40, 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, No. 09-0893 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2010). 
67 See, e.g., Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., 265 F.3d 931, 937 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(holding state contract law defenses not preempted “as long as . . . [they] are generally 
applied to all contracts”); Saturn Distrib. Corp. v. Williams, 905 F.2d 719, 725-26 (4th 
Cir. 1990) (reasoning that a state law is preempted unless it “declare[s] all contracts of 
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laws prohibiting the selection of an out-of-state dispute resolution fo-
rum in franchise or construction contracts routinely fail the “general” 
test on the ground that they apply only to contracts within certain sec-
tors (e.g., franchise, construction, etc.) and then only to contracts 
containing forum-selection clauses.68  Therefore, I interpret the Para-
digm as requiring that a state law is “generally applicable” only if it 
applies in principle to all contracts.69 
At the other extreme from a general law is a law that applies solely 
to arbitration agreements.  Consider a Montana law that required all 
arbitration clauses to be “‘typed in underlined capital letters on the 
first page of the contract.’”70  In Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, the 
Court held that this law impermissibly “singl[ed] out arbitration”71 by 
placing special conditions on arbitration agreements that did not ap-
ply to all other contracts:  “[G]enerally applicable contract defenses, 
such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invali-
date arbitration agreements without contravening § 2.  Courts may 
not, however, invalidate arbitration agreements under state laws ap-
plicable only to arbitration provisions.”72  Enforcement-impeding laws 
that “single out” arbitration, in other words, are always preempted.73  
 
adhesion to be presumptively unenforceable”); Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 
1114, 1121 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that the FAA does not preempt state rules that ap-
ply to “all” contracts); Thibodeau v. Comcast Corp., 912 A.2d 874, 880 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2006) (“[T]he FAA does not preempt the application of state law that applies equally 
to all contracts.”); cf. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 
(2006) (“Section 2 . . . places arbitration agreements on equal footing with all other 
contracts . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 For a more detailed discussion of the majority view in the lower courts, to the 
effect that the FAA preempts a state law unless the state law literally applies to “all” 
contracts, see Aragaki, supra note 27 (manuscript subsection II.B.1). 
68 See, e.g., Bradley v. Harris Research, Inc., 275 F.3d 884, 890 (9th Cir. 2001); KKW 
Enters., Inc. v. Gloria Jean’s Gourmet Coffees Franchising Corp., 184 F.3d 42, 52 (1st 
Cir. 1999).   
69 Elsewhere, I have explained why this requirement is ultimately incoherent.  See 
Aragaki, supra note 27 (manuscript Section II.B); see also Brief of Arbitration Professors 
as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 25-29, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 
No. 09-0893 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2010). 
70 Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996) (quoting MONT. 
CODE. ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1995)).  The law was enforcement impeding insofar as it 
denied enforcement to nonconforming arbitration clauses.   
71 Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687. 
72 Id. (citations omitted).  Lower courts appear to have entertained some version 
of the “single out test” prior to Casarotto.  See, e.g., Connolly, 883 F.2d at 1120 (“[A]ny 
separate regulatory action or sanction singling out arbitration agreements from con-
tracts generally would be preempted.”). 
73 See Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 29, at 204 (arguing that the Paradigm “for-
bids any state law (statutory or judicial) that singles out arbitration for suspect treat-
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Unlike those falling in the “general” category, such laws are easy to 
spot:  they apply on their face to arbitration and only arbitration. 
The following table summarizes the Paradigm as I have so far 
described it: 
 
Figure 1:  Summary of the Paradigm 
 
  
. . . singles out  
arbitration 
. . . is completely 
general 
Enforcement-
impeding state law 
that . . .  
Always preempted Not preempted 
Enforcement-neutral 
state law that . . . Not preempted Not preempted 
 
 
One remarkable aspect of the Paradigm is its formalism:  it does 
not matter why a state statute singles out arbitration, just that it does 
so.  Likewise, it is irrelevant what consequences the state law portends 
for a given arbitration agreement.  The Paradigm sees no difference 
between a law that denies legal effect to all predispute arbitration 
agreements statewide and one that merely precludes arbitrators from 
awarding certain types of remedies in a narrow class of disputes. 
II.  REINTERPRETING THE PARADIGM AS AN 
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLE 
What makes the Paradigm tick?  Why should the FAA preempt an 
enforcement-impeding law that singles out arbitration but not one 
that is completely general on its face?  In this Part, I argue that the 
Paradigm is animated by a principle of nondiscrimination—a principle 
whose purpose is to dispel stubborn prejudices about arbitration’s in-
feriority as a method of resolving disputes.  In Sections II.A through 
II.C, I elaborate on the meaning of this principle by looking at three 
 
ment”); Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor’s Associates, Inc. 
v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001, 1012 (1996) (“Any law that singles out 
arbitration agreements by making them less enforceable than other contracts is 
preempted by the FAA.”). 
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contexts in which it manifests itself most clearly:  (1) the FAA’s 
response to the historic common law “hostility” to arbitration, (2) the 
Court’s more recent FAA jurisprudence outside the preemption area, 
and (3) the Court’s current doctrinal test for FAA preemption.  In 
Section II.D, I offer some observations about how well the Paradigm 
lives up to its anti-discrimination pedigree. 
My thesis that the Paradigm expresses an anti-discrimination prin-
ciple begs the question of what exactly I mean by “anti-discrimination,” 
as the term itself has been interpreted in many different, sometimes 
contradictory, ways.  Some conceive of anti-discrimination as a principle 
of “anti-differentiation”—one that merely seeks to eliminate distinctions 
between people or things based on irrelevant differences.74  At the oth-
er extreme, progressive scholars have argued that the true task of anti-
discrimination is to overhaul the structural dominance of certain 
groups over others.  On this “anti-subordination” view, even laws or 
measures that inadvertently perpetuate historical patterns of power 
and privilege constitute impermissible discrimination.75  Between the 
two extremes lies what some have identified as an “anti-oppression” 
theory, which registers the wrongfulness of discrimination in terms of 
purposeful conduct motivated by improper considerations, such as pre-
judice toward traditionally oppressed groups.76 
Of the three models of anti-discrimination described above, the one 
that comports best with the Paradigm is the anti-oppression view.  This 
claim may strike some readers as rather surprising.  It is difficult, for in-
stance, to appreciate how arbitration could possibly have endured the 
type of oppression normally associated with minorities and women, and 
thus why the Paradigm should be interpreted as anything more than an 
anti-differentiation principle.  To this I have three responses. 
First, the central argument of this Article—that the Paradigm re-
gards arbitration as having a kind of “suspect” status—only makes 
 
74 See John Hasnas, Equal Opportunity, Affirmative Action, and the Anti-Discrimination 
Principle:  The Philosophical Basis for the Legal Prohibition of Discrimination, 71 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 423, 431-33 (2002) (providing examples of the anti-differentiation principle).  
75 See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 
157 (1976); see also Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 
2422-24 (1994). 
76 Hasnas, supra note 74, at 434-36.  I recognize that the anti-oppression view is gen-
erally considered to be a species of the anti-subordination view rather than as something 
separate from it.  See id. at 437.  In treating the two as separate, I seek merely to distinguish 
the anti-oppression view from other, more robust variants of the anti-subordination view.   
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sense on the anti-oppression or anti-subordination view.77  The anti-
differentiation theory can be ruled out on the further ground that situ-
ations in which state law favors arbitration agreements over other 
agreements do not offend the Paradigm.78  Second, as between the anti-
oppression and the anti-subordination theories, the former is more 
consistent with the Paradigm’s emphasis on reversing unjustified “hos-
tility” toward arbitration, which in turn suggests intentional—more so 
than structural—discrimination.  Moreover, as a policy matter, the 
strong redistributive and remedial rationales typically associated with 
the anti-subordination view are unpersuasive in the arbitration con-
text.79  Finally, keep in mind that I am not making an empirical claim 
about the existence or nature of “oppression” against arbitration.  Nor 
am I claiming that the FAA was originally intended to be an anti-
oppression statute.80  Instead, I simply seek to decode and render expli-
cit claims that the Court has made on the subject and to use them to 
critique existing FAA preemption jurisprudence.  Anti-discrimination 
law and theory help my analysis because they provide sophisticated 
analytical frameworks, not because they furnish governing law. 
A.  Unjustified Hostility Toward Arbitration:  Origins to 1925 
For at least two centuries prior to the advent of modern arbitra-
tion statutes in the United States, executory arbitration agreements 
were unenforceable for all practical purposes.  First, according to the 
 
77 See Reginald C. Oh, A Critical Linguistic Analysis of Equal Protection Doctrine:  Are 
Whites a Suspect Class?, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 583, 588 (2004) (describing 
the “law of suspect classes” as being more consistent with the anti-subordination than 
the anti-differentiation view); see also Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination:  
The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 297, 305 (1997).  
78 Section 2 of the FAA does not preempt state laws that privilege arbitration 
agreements over other agreements.  See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland 
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 & n.5 (1989).  Instead, it is only concerned 
with what I have defined as enforcement-impeding laws—that is, laws that adversely 
affect the enforceability of arbitration agreements.  See supra Section I.A.  Indeed, the 
FAA as a whole favors arbitration agreements by providing an elaborate mechanism for 
enforcing such agreements (but no other agreement).  See Aragaki, supra note 27 (ma-
nuscript Section IV.B); infra notes 184-89 and accompanying text. 
79 See infra notes 335-47 and accompanying text.  As compared with the anti-
subordination view, what I am referring to as the anti-oppression theory represents a 
weaker anti-discrimination regime, which in turn should make it more palatable to 
those who are uncomfortable with the anti-discrimination analogy to begin with.  I ex-
plain in greater detail why the anti-subordination view is inconsistent with the Para-
digm in the companion piece to this Article.  See Aragaki, supra note 27 (manuscript 
Section III.A). 
80 See supra text accompanying note 28. 
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common law “revocability doctrine,” parties to such agreements were 
entitled to revoke their promise to arbitrate at any time until the arbi-
trators issued their award.81  This legal loophole effectively made it im-
possible to order specific performance of an executory arbitration 
agreement, for once so ordered, the breaching party could simply turn 
around and revoke her promise.82  Without the remedy of specific 
performance, the nonbreaching party could obtain only money 
damages for breach,83 which were considered nominal at best.84  
Second, there was no legal mechanism for pleading an executory 
arbitration agreement as a complete bar to an action at law.85  Third, 
courts would not even stay a legal action pending a determination of 
arbitrability,86 thus giving plaintiffs intent on evading arbitration a 
considerable tactical advantage.  In this legal climate, arbitration 
agreements were simply not “regarded in the same light as other 
contractual obligations”—so much so that a party reneging on such a 
promise “frequently [did] not [even] realize that he [wa]s violating 
his plighted word.”87 
Early twentieth-century merchants who lobbied for the FAA’s 
passage explained the common law’s unfavorable treatment of 
arbitration agreements as the product of a long history of judicial 
“hostility” toward arbitration.88  The ostensible justification for this 
hostility was that it was against public policy to “oust[]” the courts of 
 
81 See S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2 (1924); IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION 
LAW 20 (1992).  This so-called “revocability doctrine” originated at English common 
law but became widely accepted by U.S. courts throughout the nineteenth century.  See 
Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice:  Community and Coercion Under the Federal Arbi-
tration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 974-75 (1999). 
82 See S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2 (1924); see also Tobey v. Cnty. of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 
1313, 1320-21 (C.C. Mass. 1845) (No. 14,065) (Story, J.).   
83 See Doleman & Sons v. Ossett Corp., [1912] 3 K.B. 257 at 269-71 (Eng.). 
84 See 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 64, § 4.3.2.2 (“[D]amages were generally im-
possible to prove.”). 
85 See U.S. Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006, 1010 
(S.D.N.Y. 1915); WESLEY A. STURGES, A TREATISE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND 
AWARDS § 15 (1930). 
86 See Hurst v. Litchfield, 39 N.Y. 377, 379 (1868); S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2 (1924); 
JULIUS HENRY COHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW 226-41 (1918). 
87 Cohen & Dayton, supra note 17, at 270. 
88 Although this hostility has often been described as directed at arbitration 
agreements, it was first and foremost a hostility toward the arbitral process.  See Kulu-
kundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 982-83 (2d Cir. 1942) (cri-
ticizing judicial hostility toward the arbitration process); see also Southland Corp. v. 
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1984) (linking the courts’ refusals to enforce arbitration 
agreements to the “old common-law hostility toward arbitration”); Aragaki, supra note 
27 (manuscript Part IV). 
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their jurisdiction to hear cases, even by agreement of the parties.89  
But it was difficult to square this so-called “ouster” rule with the fact 
that judges were perfectly content to cede their jurisdiction in the face 
of a valid settlement agreement, release, covenant not to sue, or 
arbitral award.90  Each, no less than executory arbitration agreements, 
invaded the courts’ prerogative to hear cases. 
These unexplained inconsistencies fed the perception that the 
law’s hostility was based on sheer anti-arbitration bias rather than on 
legitimate considerations about jurisdiction or procedure.  According 
to Julius Henry Cohen, the chief architect of the FAA, this bias 
originated in English judges, who were compensated based on the 
number of cases they heard and had accordingly developed a “great 
jealousy of arbitrations whereby Westminster Hall was robbed of [its] 
cases.”91  This, in turn, led them to manufacture a “fear that arbitration 
tribunals could not do justice between the parties.”92  Arbitrators thus 
came to be portrayed as “caricatures of their judicial siblings—‘pie 
splitters,’ who lacked requisite pedigree and cultivation.”93  Although 
they could be entrusted with incidental matters, such as whether a 
party’s obligations were adequately performed or when they came due, 
 
89 See H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924); S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2 (1924). 
90 This point was perhaps most forcefully made in Kulukundis, 126 F.2d at 983-84, 
an opinion that Judge Learned Hand joined.  See also Arbitration of Interstate Commercial 
Disputes:  Joint Hearings Before the Subcomms. of the Comms. on the Judiciary on S. 1005 and 
H.R. 646, 68th Cong. 14-15 (1924) [hereinafter 1924 Hearings] (statement of Julius 
Henry Cohen); COHEN, supra note 86, at 12, 55, 160, 205, 278. 
91 See COHEN, supra note 86, at 254 (citing Scott v. Avery, (1856) 10 Eng. Rep. 1121 
(H.L.) 1126); see also Heinrich Kronstein, Business Arbitration—Instrument of Private Gov-
ernment, 54 YALE L.J. 36, 62-63 (1944) (claiming that the financial interests of judges 
drove early English opposition to arbitration).  But see Kulukundis, 126 F.2d at 983-84 
nn.14-16 (collecting authorities on both sides of the debate).  
92 S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2-3 (1924); see also Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fa-
brics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 406 (2d Cir. 1959) (observing that English judges were willing 
to “resort[] to a great variety of devices . . . [to preserve] their monopoly of the 
administration of justice”); U.S. Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 
F. 1006, 1007-08 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (speculating that “the hostility of English-speaking 
courts to arbitration contracts probably originated . . . ‘in the contests of the courts of 
ancient times for extension of jurisdiction’” (citing Scott, 10 Eng. Rep. at 1138)); A.B.A. 
Comm. on Commerce, Trade & Commercial Law, The United States Arbitration Law and 
Its Application, 11 A.B.A. J. 153, 155 (1925). 
93 Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arbitral Justice:  The Demise of Due Process in American 
Law, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1945, 1947 (1996); cf. Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and For-
eign Commerce, and Federal Commercial Arbitration:  Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a 
Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 7 (1923) [hereinafter 1923 Hear-
ings] (statement of Charles L. Bernheimer) (describing a case in which a shipper who 
had held preconceived notions about arbitration changed his mind after familiarizing 
himself with the process). 
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they were considered incompetent to decide “question[s] of liability 
on the whole contract.”94  Even commercial lawyers, having reason to 
oppose more efficient litigation alternatives that would threaten their 
fees, initially disparaged arbitration as a “‘crude and imperfect. . . 
method of settling disputes.’”95 
Enacted in 1925, the FAA was intended to bring reason and 
modernity to bear on what the business community increasingly 
viewed as the law’s “unjust,”96 irrational,97 and “anachronis[tic]”98 
treatment of arbitration.  The new arbitration law sought to 
“revers[e]”99 this discriminatory treatment by dissolving the arbitrary 
common law doctrines that had stood in the way of enforcing 
executory arbitration agreements.100  No longer would a disgruntled 
trading partner be entitled to “refuse to perform [a valid arbitration] 
contract when it bec[ame] disadvantageous to him.”101  At long last, 
valid agreements to arbitrate would receive the law’s full backing, just 
like valid agreements to do anything else.102 
Critics such as Katherine Van Wezel Stone have persuasively 
argued that the law’s hostility toward arbitration during this period 
may not have been uniformly unjustified—that it was informed at least 
in part by valid concerns about the lack of procedural safeguards in 
arbitration or about vulnerable parties being pressured to bargain 
 
94 1924 Hearings, supra note 90, at 25 (statement of Alexander Rose); see also Tobey 
v. Cnty. of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321 (C.C. Mass. 1845) (No. 14,065) (Story, J.) 
(“[I]t has often been said, that the judgment of arbitrators is but rusticum judicium.”). 
95 Sabra A. Jones, Historical Development of Commercial Arbitration in the United States, 
12 MINN. L. REV. 240, 256 (1928) (quoting 13 CENT. L.J. 101, 101 (1881)); see also Co-
hen & Dayton, supra note 17, at 281-83. 
96 Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 130 N.E. 288, 292 (N.Y. 1921) (Cardozo, 
J.); see also Joseph Wheless, Arbitration as a Judicial Process of Law, 30 W. VA. L.Q. 209, 
213 (1924). 
97 See COHEN, supra note 86, at 47; Wesley A. Sturges & Irving Olds Murphy, Some 
Confusing Matters Relating to Arbitration Under the United States Arbitration Act, 17 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 580, 597 (1952). 
98 1924 Hearings, supra note 90, at 16 (statement of Julius Henry Cohen); H.R. REP. 
NO. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924). 
99 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 (1974). 
100 See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 225-26 (1987); H.R. 
REP. NO. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924) (recognizing that legislative action was required because 
anti-arbitration bias was so “firmly embedded in the . . . common law”).  
101 H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924). 
102 See id.; see also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 
n.12 (1967) (describing FAA’s purpose “to make arbitration agreements as enforceable 
as other contracts, but not more so”). 
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away their recourse to the courts.103  Be that as it may, the important 
point is that the FAA sought to rectify only the law’s unthinking, 
reflexive hostility toward arbitration—a hostility that, for no apparent 
reason, prevented parties who “[stood] upon an equal footing . . .  
[from] intelligently and deliberately” choosing to arbitrate their 
disputes.104  This is amply illustrated in congressional debates over the 
FAA, during which concerns were raised about the FAA’s liberal-
ization of arbitration clauses in contexts such as employment and 
insurance, where contracts were typically presented on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis.105  Supporters of the FAA were readily capable of distin-
guishing these legitimate concerns from the less discerning “jealousy” 
of the early common law courts.106  Thus, W.H.H. Piatt, the chairman 
of the ABA committee that had proposed the FAA to Congress, 
declared that he would “not favor any kind of legislation that would 
permit the forcing [of] a man to sign” an arbitration clause and, 
moreover, that the FAA was not intended to apply to employment and 
insurance contracts.107  Congress accordingly amended Section 1 to ex-
clude “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any 
other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.”108 
To be sure, it is unlikely that drafters of the FAA conceived of the 
statute’s purpose in terms of remedying “discrimination” against arbi-
tration.  Nonetheless, the historical record is replete with anti-
discrimination themes.  In the years following the FAA’s passage, the 
Court would eventually organize those themes into a much more co-
herent norm of anti-discrimination. 
 
103 See, e.g., Van Wezel Stone, supra note 81, at 969-94. 
104 COHEN, supra note 86, at 228 (quoting Del. & H. Canal Co. v. Pa. Coal Co., 50 
N.Y. 250, 258 (1872)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Even Van Wezel Stone 
would agree with this statement insofar as she argues that the FAA should not necessar-
ily preempt state laws that fail to reflect this unjustified hostility toward arbitration.  See 
Van Wezel Stone, supra note 81, at 1024-30.  And if Van Wezel Stone is correct that 
arbitration was generally used at the turn of the century only between members of a 
self-regulating body or between parties with relatively equal bargaining power, Con-
gress could hardly have intended the FAA as an unqualified endorsement of all the 
ways in which arbitration agreements are used today.  See id. at 969-1014; accord Stern-
light, supra note 18, at 647. 
105 See 1923 Hearings, supra note 93, at 11 (statement of W.H.H. Piatt). 
106 Park Constr. Co. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 32 Carver Cnty., 296 N.W. 475, 477 
(Minn. 1941). 
107 1923 Hearings, supra note 93, at 10 (statement of W.H.H. Piatt). 
108 Id. at 14 (reprinting Letter from Herbert Hoover, Sec’y of Commerce, to Tho-
mas Sterling, Senator ( Jan. 31, 1923)); see also id. at 9 (statement of W.H.H. Piatt). 
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B.  Hostility in the Form of Suspicious Generalizations About  
Arbitration:  1925 to the Present 
In his discussion of what makes discrimination “wrong,” Larry 
Alexander draws a useful distinction between biases and general-
izations.109  Alexander describes biases as categorical preferences that 
apply regardless of context.110  They reflect a judgment that persons 
with a certain trait “are morally less worthy than others merely by virtue 
of possessing that trait.”111  For example, the antimiscegenation law 
challenged in Loving v. Virginia112 reflected a bias because it prohibited 
marriage between certain individuals solely because of their race; that 
is, it targeted race “for its own sake.”113 
By contrast, generalizations, proxies, and stereotypes reflect 
judgments that persons with a certain trait (the proxy trait) are likely 
to possess a further trait (the material trait) that, in turn, is a perfectly 
“proper bas[is] for attributing differential moral worth.”114  For 
example, the government’s World War II–era decision to relocate 
Japanese Americans living on the West Coast is better described as a 
generalization than a bias because it used race as a proxy for a further 
trait (national loyalty), which in turn was a legitimate trait to consider 
in making decisions about national security.115  To be sure, the 
generalization that most Japanese Americans would be disloyal to the 
United States may itself mask a bias against Japanese Americans.  But 
because generalizations and proxy judgments are also frequently ac-
curate and possess a certain heuristic value,116 it is not always easy to 
differentiate between problematic and unproblematic ones. 
 
109 See Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong?  Biases, Prefe-
rences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 158-76 (1992). 
110 Id. at 158.  
111 Id. at 161; cf. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) 
(“[L]aws grounded in [race, alienage, or national origin] considerations are deemed 
to reflect prejudice and antipathy—a view that those in the burdened class are not as 
worthy or deserving as others.”). 
112 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
113 Mary Ann Case, “The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns”:  Constitutional Sex Discrim-
ination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1454 (2000). 
114 Alexander, supra note 109, at 161; see also Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 
Term—Foreword:  In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10 (1976).  
115 See Case, supra note 113, at 1452-53. 
116 See Alexander, supra note 109, at 167 (“We could not function [in society] 
without proxies and the stereotypes on which they are based.”); see also Brest, supra 
note 114, at 6 (“Regulations and decisions based on statistical generalizations are 
commonplace in all developed societies and essential to their functioning.”). 
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The prevailing account of anti-arbitration hostility during the pre-
FAA years suggests a categorical bias rather than a proxy judgment 
insofar as the ouster doctrine was directed at arbitration per se, 
regardless of considerations such as the nature of the dispute to be 
arbitrated or the existence of any power imbalance between the 
parties.  Scholars such as Ian Macneil have rightly questioned whether 
this narrative of hostility has not been greatly exaggerated as a matter 
of historical fact.117  Even if Macneil is correct, however, the narrative 
remains consistent with the existence of subtler forms of hostility in 
the guise of problematic generalizations and stereotypes about arbi-
tration.  For instead of dismissing arbitration wholesale, more 
sophisticated opponents have typically claimed that certain process 
dangers are inextricably associated with arbitration to argue that the 
problem lies with those dangers rather than with arbitration itself.118  
The evolution of the Court’s nonarbitrability doctrine—which has to 
do with whether claims under selected federal statutes are immune 
from arbitration despite the existence of a valid agreement to 
arbitrate—provides a case in point. 
Beginning in the 1950s, plaintiffs seeking redress under federal 
statutes such as the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act brought their claims in court despite having signed 
valid predispute arbitration clauses covering those claims.119  The Court 
initially permitted this practice.  It considered certain issues such as se-
curities fraud and employment discrimination simply “too important” 
to be entrusted to arbitration.120  It observed that arbitration generally 
does not afford a robust factfinding process.121  And although arbitra-
tors might be “competent to resolve many preliminary factual ques-
 
117 See MACNEIL, supra note 81, at 19-21; see also Atl. Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 
276 F. 319, 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1921); Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, Judicial Enforcement 
of Predispute Arbitration Agreements:  Back to the Future, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
249, 272-77 (2003).   
118 See Carbonneau, supra note 93, at 1947-48 (arguing that, in the international 
context, most civil law codes did not “directly repudiate arbitration” but rather 
“quietly undermined” it). 
119 The theory was that such plaintiffs were not simply seeking compensation for 
private injury; instead, they were attempting to vindicate important public values safe-
guarded by the relevant statute.  In some cases, moreover, these plaintiffs were pro-
ceeding in the capacity of a private attorney general.  See 2 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 
31, § 16.1.2. 
120 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 632 
(1985) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723 F.2d 
155, 162 (1st Cir. 1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
121 See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57-58 (1974). 
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tions, such as whether the employee ‘punched in’ when he said he 
did,”122 they were “wholly unqualified to decide legal issues”123 or issues 
of “great public interest.”124  Moreover, any errors they made would be 
virtually impervious to correction, as there is no meaningful appellate 
review of arbitral awards.125  This, in turn, would frustrate the proper 
interpretation and development of federal statutory law.126 
It is difficult to quarrel with many of these generalizations.  For 
instance, it is typically (but not always) true that judicial review of arbi-
tral awards is extremely limited.127  Indeed, many often tout this aspect 
of arbitration as one of its chief advantages over litigation.128  Similarly, 
for a long time it was not unreasonable to surmise that most labor arbi-
trators did not possess legal training.129  From these widely held observa-
tions, it was not preposterous for the Court to conclude that arbitration 
 
122 Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 743 (1981). 
123 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 407 (1967) 
(Black, J., dissenting); see also Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 743-44.  
124 Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827 (2d Cir. 
1968).     
125 See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., Inc., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956); Wilko 
v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-47 (1953).   
126 See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 57; Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436-47. 
127 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9, 10, 11 (2006).  But even this uncontroversial statement re-
quires some qualification.  First, until recently, several circuits had allowed parties to 
include a provision for de novo judicial review of the arbitrators’ award.  E.g., P.R. Tel. 
Co. v. U.S. Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 30-31 (1st Cir. 2005).  The Court put an 
end to this practice—at least insofar as the FAA is concerned—in Hall St. Assocs. v. Mat-
tel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 588 (2008). 
 Second, some parties may be contracting for second-tier review in the form of 
appellate arbitration.  Arbitration providers have drafted sample appellate arbitra-
tion provisions and rules of appellate arbitration, suggesting that the practice is not 
altogether uncommon.  See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, DRAFTING DISPUTE RESO-
LUTION CLAUSES:  A PRACTICAL GUIDE 37 (2007), available at http://www.adr.org/ 
si.asp?id=4125; JAMS FOUND., OPTIONAL ARBITRATION APPEAL PROCEDURE 2-5 (2003), 
available at http://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMS_ 
Optional_Appeal_Procedures-2003.pdf. 
128 A defining credo of the modern arbitration movement was that arbitrators’ er-
rors of law should not be reviewed by a court, lest arbitration remain a mere prelude to 
judicial proceedings.  See MACNEIL, supra note 81, at 15-16.   
129 See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 57 n.18 (referring to a survey finding that “a sub-
stantial portion of labor arbitrators” had no law degree).  Richard Shell suggests that 
there might have been “marginally more lawyers acting as arbitrators in commer-
cial . . . arbitration[s].”  G. Richard Shell, ERISA and Other Federal Employment Statutes:  
When Is Commercial Arbitration an “Adequate Substitute” for the Courts?, 68 TEX. L. REV. 509, 
531 n.153 (1990); see also id. at 520 n.58 (collecting statistics on the percentage of labor 
arbitrators who possess law degrees). 
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was generally not an “adequate substitute for a judicial proceeding,”130 
at least with regard to a special class of federal statutory claims. 
Nonetheless, the outcome of these early nonarbitrability cases was 
difficult to reconcile with the undeniable fact that courts routinely en-
forced both (1) postdispute agreements to arbitrate such claims and 
(2) all such agreements where both parties were members of the sec-
urities industry.131  If the arbitration process lacked the necessary machi-
nery to protect public values enshrined in federal statutes or to ensure 
the proper evolution of legal doctrine, this should be the case regard-
less of whether the parties struck the agreement after the dispute arose 
or whether the parties were members of the same regulated prof-
ession—that is, regardless of the nature of the agreement to arbitrate.132 
In hindsight, this unexplained inconsistency rendered the early 
nonarbitrability cases suspect.  The Court came to fear that some of 
the generalizations on which it had relied were in fact “pervaded 
by . . . the old judicial hostility to arbitration.”133  Accordingly, the 
Court began to demand empirical evidence before concluding that a 
chosen arbitration procedure was incapable of vindicating important 
federal rights.  Thus, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 
Inc., the Court refused to accept the bare assertion that the “potential 
complexity” of antitrust claims made them inappropriate for arbitra-
 
130 Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 222-23 (1985). 
131 See 2 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 31, § 16.2.1 (noting that the nonarbitrability 
defense did not apply to the arbitration of existing, as opposed to future, disputes); see 
also Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 233 (1987); C. Edward 
Fletcher, III, Privatizing Securities Disputes Through the Enforcement of Arbitration Agree-
ments, 71 MINN. L. REV. 393, 420-27 (1987). 
132 The agreement may certainly be relevant to other concerns, such as whether 
the parties had (or should have) voluntarily and knowingly chosen arbitration.  But 
that is a separate matter.  As Ian Macneil has argued in the antitrust context, the “es-
sence of the [nonarbitrability doctrine] . . . is the appropriateness of arbitration to de-
cide matters of public importance, not a policy against coerced arbitration agree-
ments.”  2 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 31, § 16.6.3; see also McMahon, 482 U.S. at 228-31; 
Robert B. von Mehren, From Vynior’s Case to Mitsubishi:  The Future of Arbitration and 
Public Law, 12 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 583, 618 (1986).  But see Sternlight, supra note 18, at 
647-48 (arguing that the outcome of the earliest nonarbitrability cases was primarily 
driven by a concern for unwary consumers who may not have voluntarily or 
intelligently consented to arbitration). 
133 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480 (1989) 
(quoting Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Armtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d 
Cir. 1942)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 
S. Ct. 1456, 1470 (2009). 
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tion.134  To the contrary, it observed that arbitrators may be selected 
based on their subject-matter expertise and, if not, that experts may 
be appointed to assist them.135  In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 
the Court dispensed with mere “speculat[ion] that arbitration panels 
will be biased.”136  And in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 
the Court condemned the law’s “general suspicion of the desirability 
of arbitration,” finding no reason “to assume at the outset that 
arbitrators will not follow the law.”137 
By interrogating otherwise reasonable generalizations about 
arbitration, the Court unveiled the FAA’s anti-discrimination bona 
fides.  As Paul Brest has explained in the context of race: 
The antidiscrimination principle fills a special need because—as even a 
glance at history indicates—race-dependent decisions that are rational and 
purport to be based solely on legitimate considerations are likely in fact to 
rest on assumptions of the differential worth of racial groups or on the 
related phenomenon of racially selective sympathy and indifference.
138
 
Rationality presents a low bar.  The government’s generalizations 
about Japanese American loyalties during World War II, for instance, 
were not necessarily irrational.139  We scrutinize such race-based 
proxies more carefully, however, because we have reason to suspect that 
they might mask “displaced biases” about the inferiority of one group to 
another,140 or because they might tacitly perpetuate existing stereotypes 
 
134 473 U.S. 614, 632-34 (1985) (emphasis added); see also McMahon, 482 U.S. at 
232 (observing that arbitral tribunals are “readily capable of handling the factual and 
legal complexities of antitrust claims”). 
135 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 633. 
136 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991). 
137 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987) (emphasis added).  
138 Brest, supra note 114, at 7. 
139 Id. at 6-7; see also 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-
18, at 966 (3d ed. 2000); Sanford Levinson, Response, The Deepening Crisis of American 
Constitutionalism, 40 GA. L. REV. 889, 911 (2006); cf. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST 31 (1980) (noting that apartheid could be considered “a rational, if mis-
guided, means of avoiding racial strife” (emphasis omitted)). 
140 See Alexander, supra note 109, at 169-70; Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protec-
tion:  A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1052 (1979) (“[T]here 
is the difficulty of determining whether a particular gender-dependent law is predi-
cated on a factual generalization or, instead, on the illicit view of women as morally 
subordinate and inferior.”). 
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or inequalities between groups.141  That extra scrutiny is a hallmark of 
the (anti-oppression-based) anti-discrimination principle.142 
The Court’s later nonarbitrability cases evince this same anti-
discrimination impulse by holding generalizations about arbitration to 
the fire.  Those cases stand for the proposition that courts may not 
“assum[e] the [arbitral] forum inadequate or its selection unfair.”143  
Judges must not issue sweeping pronouncements about the “essential 
characteristics”144 of arbitration that purportedly make it an “inferior 
system of justice.”145  And they may no longer refuse to enforce other-
wise valid predispute arbitration agreements based on “outmoded pre-
sumption[s]” that are “far out of step” with the FAA’s more forward-
looking view of arbitration.146  Instead, they must examine specific fea-
tures of the arbitral process contemplated by the parties to determine 
whether they are sufficient to protect the statutory rights at issue.147 
To be clear, there were (and continue to be) valid, nondiscrimina-
tory reasons for treating arbitration differently from courtroom adjudi-
cation.  The trouble with the early nonarbitrability cases was never the 
simple fact that the Court withheld certain federal statutory claims from 
arbitration, for courts may still do so if a signatory to an arbitration 
agreement can prove she will be unable “effectively [to] vindicate [her] 
statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum”148—in other words, if she 
can prove that there are justifiable grounds for discriminating against 
arbitration.  Instead, the trouble was that the Court did so too dismis-
 
141 See Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736 (2003); J.E.B. v. Ala-
bama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 139-40 (1994). 
142 It is, of course, also a hallmark of the anti-subordination view more generally. 
See supra note 76. 
143 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633 
(1985). 
144 Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 259 (1987) (Blackmun, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
145 Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743, 751 n.12 (8th Cir. 
1986); see also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974) (calling the 
arbitration process “inferior” to the judicial process). 
146 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989).  
Compare these statements with the Court’s declaration just four years earlier that 
gender-based classifications trigger heightened scrutiny because they “very likely reflect 
outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of men and women.”  City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985).  
147 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30-32 (1991). 
148 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637; accord Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 
U.S. 79, 90-91 (2000); McMahon, 482 U.S. at 239-42.    
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sively, based on a “general suspicion of the desirability of arbitration 
and the competence of arbitral tribunals.”149 
To the extent the Court and others maintain that arbitration 
continues to suffer unjustified discrimination,150 the discrimination 
likely takes the form of these seemingly innocuous generalizations 
rather than wholesale anti-arbitration bias—what Peter B. Rutledge 
characterizes as “irresistible melodies tempting the listener to oppose 
arbitration.”151  They are irresistible because, as critics of arbitration 
point out, they are frequently perfectly reasonable. 
Consider the following “finding” of the Arbitration Fairness Act 
currently pending before Congress:  “Many corporations add to their 
arbitration clauses unfair provisions that deliberately tilt the systems 
against individuals, including provisions that strip individuals of 
substantive statutory rights, ban class actions, and force people to 
arbitrate their claims hundreds of miles from their homes.”152  
Depending on how one understands “many,” existing empirical 
research is quite consistent with—and certainly does not contradict—
this claim.  For example, in their study of fifty-two arbitration clauses 
in consumer contracts, Linda Demaine and Deborah Hensler found 
that 30.8% contained class action bans and 7.7% contained explicit 
limitations on damages.153  Similarly, the Searle Civil Justice Institute 
recently found that 24.3% of arbitration clauses surveyed contained a 
limitation on punitive damages,154 while 36.5% of arbitration clauses 
 
149 McMahon, 482 U.S. at 231. 
150 See Carbonneau, supra note 10, at 233, 253, 261, 262 (contending that arbitra-
tion continues to be the object of “demonization” and “hatred,” based either on sheer 
ignorance of the arbitral process or a chauvinistic view of litigation as the “one true 
religion”); infra Section IV.A. 
151 Peter B. Rutledge, Who Can Be Against Fairness?  The Case Against the Arbitration 
Fairness Act, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 267, 267 (2008). 
152 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, S. 931, 111th Cong. § 2(7) (2009); 
see also Kenneth F. Dunham, Binding Arbitration and Specific Performance Under the FAA:  
Will This Marriage of Convenience Survive?, 3 J. AM. ARB. 187, 238 (2004); cf. Jean R. 
Sternlight, Fixing the Mandatory Arbitration Problem:  We Need the Arbitration Fairness Act of 
2009, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 2009, at 5, 5. 
153 Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through Pre-
dispute Arbitration Clauses:  The Average Consumer’s Experience, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Winter–Spring 2004, at 55, 65, 71.   
154 SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST., CONSUMER ARBITRATION BEFORE THE AMERICAN 
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION 85 (2009) (on file with author).  According to this report, 
the incidence of class arbitration waiver provisions appears to differ from industry to 
industry.  For example, 100% of the cellular telephone contracts that the report 
surveyed, but 0% of the insurance or real estate contracts, contained class action bans.  
Id. at 103. 
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from another sample contained class arbitration waivers.155  True, 
these percentages are no ringing endorsement for the charge of 
widespread abuse.156  But the use of class action bans and damage 
waivers does not need to reach pandemic levels before the state is 
justified in taking action against them. 
Consider also the widely expressed view that corporate repeat 
players “will likely select arbitrators who are at least unconsciously bi-
ased toward [them]”157 and that “[a]lthough such an individual may 
well do her best to decide the case fairly, she will probably be able to 
see the company’s position more easily than the little guy’s posi-
tion.”158  Because arbitration is a market-based dispute resolution me-
chanism, it is at the very least plausible that arbitrators are prone to be 
biased in favor of “repeat player” clients.159  Again, there is very little 
conclusive evidence that arbitrators actually are biased.160  But it is not 
unreasonable for a state legislature to rely on even “weak” and 
“dubious” generalizations about arbitration when passing legislation 
or crafting legal rules, any more than it is for an airline to refuse to 
employ overweight persons based on the real but statistically unsup-
portable fear that they will suffer a heart attack on the job.161 
What makes these generalizations problematic to the Court and 
others is not so much that they are irrational or unsupported by em-
pirical data (they are not).  Rather, the problem is that they are suspect 
in light of the perceived historic “hostility” against arbitration.  These 
generalizations all share what Thomas Carbonneau has described as 
the “familiar ring [of] . . . distrust” toward arbitration that the FAA 
 
155 Id. 
156 See Peter B. Rutledge, Common Ground in the Arbitration Debate, 1 Y.B. ARB. & 
MEDIATION 1, 1-6 (2009); cf. Rutledge, supra note 151, at 268 (acknowledging that the 
U.S. arbitration system is not “flawless, but it has largely worked well”). 
157 Sternlight, supra note 18, at 684.  
158 Id.   
159 O’DONNELL, supra note 4, at 2.  The Public Citizen report notes that arbitrators 
have “a strong financial incentive to rule in favor of the companies that file cases 
against consumers because they can make hundreds of thousands of dollars a year 
conducting arbitrations.”  Id.  Rutledge observes that extant empirical research has 
established a repeat player phenomenon and that the existence of this phenomenon—
but not its cause—serves as “common ground” between arbitration’s supporters and 
detractors.  Rutledge, supra note 156, at 4 tbl.2. 
160 See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration:  Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. 
REV. 1631, 1658 (2005) (conceding the difficulties in gathering empirical evidence 
about arbitration). 
161 Brest, supra note 114, at 6-7. 
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seeks to reverse.162  In form, they are not unlike stereotyped judgments 
that frequently lead to litigation in the employment context:  “older 
employees have problems adapting to changes”;163 “women . . . are too 
‘emotional’”;164 Asian Americans are “unassertive.”165  In both contexts, 
existing law demands particularized facts in place of generalizations 
based on anecdotal evidence.  This is the way in which the Court 
regards any classification that disadvantages arbitration (like those 
that disadvantage women or racial minorities) to be suspect.  It is also 
the sense in which I argue that the Court endows arbitration with a 
kind of “suspect” status. 
Critics of the Paradigm, such as Jean Sternlight, contend that the 
Court’s demands for particularized facts are little more than a 
“rhetorical game” that quietly shifts the burden to them to come up 
with all the empirical evidence to demonstrate that arbitration is 
inadequate for certain types of disputes.166  What Sternlight perceives 
as a mere ploy, however, is actually the Paradigm’s anti-discrimination 
principle at work.  The lesson of the Court’s later nonarbitrability 
cases is that imperfect generalizations, which would be sufficient to 
justify legislative intervention in other areas, are potentially 
problematic in the arbitration context because they are likely to 
disguise improper motives or perhaps reinforce the widely held 
perception of arbitration as “second-class adjudication.”167  For this 
reason, the Court forces us to presume that arbitration and 
courtroom adjudication are equal and requires those who insist 
otherwise to defend their chain of reasoning in the clear light of day. 
C.  The Anti-discrimination Logic of the Single-Out/General Test 
In the age of “mandatory” binding arbitration, the claim that arbi-
tration continues to suffer something like discrimination is scarcely 
believable—perhaps even perverse.  This perception has understand-
 
162 THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
ARBITRATION 230 (2d ed. 2000). 
163 Beshears v. Asbill, 930 F.2d 1348, 1354 (8th Cir. 1991). 
164 Lindahl v. Air Fr., 930 F.2d 1434, 1439 (9th Cir. 1991). 
165 Chin v. Runnels, 343 F. Supp. 2d 891, 907 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
166 Sternlight, supra note 152, at 5. 
167 Carbajal v. H&R Block Tax Servs., Inc., 372 F.3d 903, 906 (7th Cir. 2004) (Eas-
terbrook, J.); cf. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employ-
ment Rights:  The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017, 1046 (1996) 
(noting the “significant and growing sentiment” that “arbitration relegates workers to 
second-class justice”). 
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ably led many skeptics to reject an anti-discrimination interpretation 
of the Paradigm.168  In sharp contrast, I argue that we should take that 
interpretation quite seriously—not because it best reflects empirical 
truths or sound policy judgments in the arbitration area, but because 
it best captures the rhetoric that courts invoke to justify what amounts 
to “overrid[ing] the will of [a] democratically elected state legisla-
ture.”169  Understanding the anti-discrimination logic behind that rhe-
toric will help us to better critique the Paradigm and the extra-
ordinary displacement of state law that it makes possible. 
Take the Paradigm’s doctrinal test for preemption.  The “single-
out/general” test is a proxy for determining whether a state law 
impermissibly discriminates against arbitration agreements.  Just as 
equal protection law presumes that laws singling out a protected class 
do so based on improper motives (thus triggering heightened scrutiny), 
the Paradigm perceives any law that targets arbitration on its face as 
decidedly anti-arbitration:  redolent of the “old common-law hos-
tility.”170  The association between singling out arbitration and invidious 
treatment is so powerful that the Paradigm—unlike anti-discrimination 
law—can scarcely imagine a law that both singles out arbitration and 
expresses none of the trademark hostility toward it.  Thus, when securi-
ties investors argued that a state regulation was not “inhospitable” or 
“unfriendl[y]” to arbitration (and therefore not preempted) simply be-
cause it imposed special requirements solely on arbitration agreements, 
the First Circuit rejected the argument as sheer “casuistry.”171  On the 
court’s view, any law that singles out arbitration “revivif[ies] the ancient 
jurisdictional antagonism toward arbitration”172 by definition. 
Similarly, drawing on the plain text of FAA section 2, the Court 
has held that when states invalidate arbitration clauses “upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con-
 
168 See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game:  Strategic Judging 
and the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1454-55 (2008); Mi-
chael Schneidereit, A Cold Night:  Unconscionability as a Defense to Mandatory Arbitration 
Clauses in Employment Agreements, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 987, 999 (2004). 
169 Schwartz, State Judges, supra note 16, at 141.  
170 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14 (1984); see also Stirlen v. Supercuts, 
Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 153 (Ct. App. 1997) (“State laws held preempted by the 
FAA . . . reflect the traditional antiarbitration bias.”); Margaret M. Harding, The Clash 
Between Federal and State Arbitration Law and the Appropriateness of Arbitration as a Dispute 
Resolution Process, 77 NEB. L. REV. 397, 474 (1998) (“The FAA does not permit unequal 
treatment; it does not permit the states to single out arbitration agreements . . . .”). 
171 Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1117, 1120, 1124 (1st Cir. 1989). 
172 Id. at 1120. 
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tract,”173 they do not violate the FAA’s anti-discrimination mandate.174  
As Macneil put it, “the concept of general contract law is intended to 
prevent states from treating agreements to arbitrate differently from 
other contracts.”175  The Paradigm sees no need for preemption in this 
case because “arbitration agreements are neither favored nor dis-
favored, but simply placed upon an equal footing with other 
contracts.”176  Here the Paradigm suffers from the opposite problem:  
it has trouble imagining how a law that applies across the board to all 
contracts could possibly be described as anti-arbitration. 
Several courts and commentators are keenly attuned to the way in 
which the Paradigm functions as an anti-discrimination principle, 
even though they have stopped short of exploring the nature of that 
principle in any depth.  The California Supreme Court, for example, 
has on several occasions described the FAA as preempting state laws 
that “discriminate against arbitration clauses.”177  Other courts have 
likewise held state law preempted because it “discriminat[ed]” against 
arbitration.178  And more than one commentator has, in passing, 
characterized the FAA as an “anti-discrimination statute”179 or as “a 
sort of ‘equal protection’ clause for arbitration provisions.”180  For 
 
173 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
174 See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995); Prima 
Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967).   
175 1 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 64, § 10.7.2 (emphasis omitted). 
176 Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 698 (Cal. 2000). 
177 E.g., Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1113 (Cal. 2005). 
178 Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. C.A. Reaseguradora Nacional de Venez., 991 F.2d 
42, 46 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Allen v. World Inspection Network Int’l, Inc., 911 A.2d 
484, 493 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006); cf. Banc One Acceptance Corp. v. Hill, 367 
F.3d 426, 432 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding state law not preempted because it failed to 
“discriminate[] against arbitration”); Wells v. Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B., 768 A.2d 620, 
629 (Md. 2001) (same). 
179 Ratner & Turner, supra note 25, at 797-98; see also Harding, supra note 170, at 457 
(suggesting that the FAA preempts state laws that “discriminate against arbitration”). 
180 Ling, supra note 26, at 193; see also Stephen A. Broome, An Unconscionable Appli-
cation of the Unconscionability Doctrine:  How the California Courts Are Circumventing the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act, 3 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 39, 43 (2006); Michael G. McGuinness & Adam 
J. Karr, California’s “Unique” Approach to Arbitration:  Why This Road Less Traveled Will 
Make All the Difference on the Issue of Preemption Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 2005 J. 
DISP. RESOL. 61, 78 n.145; Henry Paul Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State-Court 
Determinations of State Law in Constitutional Cases, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1919, 1955 & 
n.171 (2003); Jack Wilson, “No-Class-Action Arbitration Clauses,” State-Law Unconscionabili-
ty, and the Federal Arbitration Act:  A Case For Federal Judicial Restraint and Congressional 
Action, 23 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 737, 793 (2004).  
 Recently, both parties in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion argued to the Court that 
the so-called “savings clause” in section 2 is best understood as an anti-discrimination 
principle, and thus that the FAA should preempt state laws when they discriminate 
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example, Alan Rau has argued that the FAA prohibits states from 
“discriminat[ing] against [arbitration agreements] by treating them 
more harshly than other contractual terms.”181  To Ian Macneil, “state 
law that limits federal arbitration law in a discriminatory manner . . . is 
plainly and simply preempted.”182  Similarly, Jeffrey Stempel reasons 
that higher standards of consent for arbitration agreements would be 
preempted because they “discriminat[e] against arbitration.”183 
Here one could argue that, far from an anti-discrimination policy, 
the Paradigm represents “a national policy favoring arbitration.”184  
There are two ways to understand this objection.  The first is that the 
Paradigm is better described as a norm of favoritism than one of anti-
discrimination.  The problem with this line of argument is that favorit-
ism and anti-discrimination are not necessarily inconsistent with each 
other.  From the anti-oppression perspective, for instance, granting 
preferences to historically oppressed groups can play an important 
role in furthering nondiscrimination.185  Similarly, to the extent the 
Paradigm favors arbitration, it does so only in the service of reversing 
the anti-arbitration hostility that the Court so fears.186  It does not 
 
against arbitration.  See Brief for Petitioner at 28, No. 09-0893 (U.S. Aug. 2, 2010) (re-
ferring to the “fundamental nondiscrimination principle” in section 2); Brief for Res-
pondents at 9-10, No. 09-0893 (U.S. Sept. 29, 2010) (arguing that “Section 2 establish-
es a rule of nondiscrimination toward arbitration”). 
181 Alan Scott Rau, Does State Arbitration Law Matter at All?  Part I:  Federal Preemption, 
ADR CURRENTS, June 1998, at 19, 19 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bruhl, 
supra note 168, at 1451, 1454-55 (describing as a principle of nondiscrimination the 
FAA’s requirement that state courts apply the unconscionability doctrine in a way that 
does not single out arbitration agreements); Burton, supra note 30, at 483 (same); 
Harding, supra note 170, at 457 (criticizing the Court for preempting state contract 
rules “even though those rules did not discriminate against arbitration”). 
182 2 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 31, § 16.6.2.1. 
183 Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium:  The Return of 
Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 757, 799 (2004). 
184 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (emphasis added).  Kenneth 
Dunham, for instance, argues that in cases preceding Southland, the Court set the stage 
for giving elevated status to arbitration agreements.  Dunham, supra note 152, at 210; 
see also Sternlight, supra note 18, at 661-62.   
185 See Brest, supra note 114, at 16-19. 
186 See Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 130 S. Ct. 2847, 2859 (2010) 
(explaining the federal policy favoring arbitration as “merely an acknowledgment of 
the FAA’s commitment to ‘overrule the judiciary’s longstanding refusal to enforce 
agreements to arbitrate and to place such agreements upon the same footing as other 
contracts’” (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 
489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)). 
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force arbitration on unwilling parties, nor does it prioritize arbitration 
over other forms of dispute resolution.187 
The second interpretation of the objection is that even if the Pa-
radigm expresses a norm of nondiscrimination, in practice courts flout 
that norm by reaching consistently pro-arbitration outcomes.  But a 
disjunct between fact and norm does not necessitate the conclusion 
that the norm itself is flawed.188  In fact, it is equally compatible with 
the anti-discrimination approach I develop, which sees in this disjunct 
an even greater reason to enforce the norm rather than retreat from it. 
D.  Rethinking the Paradigm 
From an anti-discrimination perspective, it is a mistake to think that 
all enforcement-impeding laws that single out arbitration impermissibly 
discriminate and that all generally applicable enforcement-impeding 
laws do not.  Enforcement-impeding laws are not anti-arbitration 
simply because they target arbitration clauses, but rather because they 
do so out of unjustified hostility toward arbitration.189  On the other 
hand, a law cannot be cleared from the taint of discrimination simply 
because it is general in form:  hostility can be expressed in subtle ways, 
not just through facial classifications.  An anti-discrimination model of 
FAA preemption would incorporate these insights, as represented in 




187 See Volt, 489 U.S. at 476 (holding that parties are free to place limits on their 
arbitration process).  In absolute terms, therefore, “[t]here is no federal policy favor-
ing arbitration.”  Id.; see also Ware, supra note 17, at 538 (describing the presumption in 
favor of arbitration as merely a “tie-breaker” for resolving doubts about the scope of an 
existing arbitration agreement). 
188 The Paradigm’s most vocal critics typically draw this very conclusion, which 
leads many of them to seek solutions in Congress rather than in the Court’s own juri-
sprudence.  See infra notes 214-17 and accompanying text. 
189 See, e.g., Jevne v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 542, 552 (Ct. App. 2003) (“[S]tate 
laws that are not anti-arbitration or antagonistic to the process are not automatically 
preempted by the FAA even though the state law relates only to arbitration agreements.”). 
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Figure 2:  An Anti-discrimination-Based  
Model of FAA Preemption 
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The touchstone for obstacle-preemption analysis is whether a 
state law or rule “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”190  I argue 
that the FAA’s purpose must be understood as displacing only state 
laws that unjustifiably discriminate against arbitration agreements—
that is, laws motivated by arbitrary hostility, mistrust, or suspicious 
generalizations about arbitration itself.191  Only state laws that offend 
this anti-discrimination principle should be displaced by the 
Supremacy Clause.192 
In Parts III and IV, I will attempt to defend an alternative preemp-
tion model based on Figure 2.  I suggest that such a model would be 
useful for both critics and proponents of arbitration alike.  By propos-
ing ways to scale back the Paradigm’s preemptive reach, I hope to ad-
dress the concerns of those who claim that arbitration agreements are 
fundamentally unjust in certain contexts.  On the other hand, by of-
fering ways of adapting the Paradigm to capture discrimination in the 
application of general contract defenses, I hope to allay the concerns 
of those who fear that a new anti-arbitration crusade is afoot. 
 
190 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000) (quoting Hines 
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
191 See Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 29, at 195 (“At the core, the Court’s 
preemption analysis merely aims at cleaning away any lingering anti-arbitration senti-
ment found in state statutes and case law.”). 
192 To reiterate, this Article is limited to FAA preemption based on section 2.  See 
supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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In advancing these arguments, I shall draw upon the conceptual 
resources of other anti-discrimination regimes such as the Equal 
Protection Clause, Title VII, and the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade.  To be sure, there are important differences among these 
regimes.193  In the discussion that follows, I intentionally elide some of 
these key differences in order to focus on the basic anti-discrimination 
principles that the regimes all share. 
Some will undoubtedly question whether the Court’s Dormant 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence would not provide a better point of 
comparison.  After all, arbitration agreements are not persons, and 
the claims that inhere in them seem more economic than dignitary in 
nature.  The objection would have more force if my aim were to 
articulate a substantive law of anti-discrimination for the right to 
enforce arbitration agreements.  But my purpose is instead to use 
basic anti-discrimination concepts—concepts common to most 
established anti-discrimination regimes—to help refine existing FAA 
preemption analysis.  In this Part, I have attempted to show that this 
analysis presupposes a theory of arbitration’s “suspect” status.  The 
Court’s equal protection (and, to a lesser extent, Civil Rights Acts) 
jurisprudence is simply the most sophisticated model for 
understanding, indentifying, and addressing the problem of suspect, 
status-based discrimination. 
III.  OVERPREEMPTION AND THE PROBLEM OF JUSTIFIED DISCRIMINATION 
In this Part, I focus exclusively on enforcement-impeding laws that 
single out arbitration.  It is fair to assume that any law targeting arbi-
tration (and only arbitration) on its face does so intentionally.194  My 
aim here is to challenge the Paradigm’s assumption that if a state law 
purposefully disfavors arbitration, then the law is necessarily proble-
matic from an anti-discrimination perspective.  This faulty assumption, 
I argue, has led to the overpreemption of state law. 
 
193 Others have argued that some of these differences are “artificial” and “can obscure 
our ability to understand the broader issues governing the Court’s limited antidiscrim-
ination vision.”  Selmi, supra note 77, at 285; see also Hasnas, supra note 74, at 485 n.231.   
194 Similarly, in the equal protection context, the Court has held that no showing 
of discriminatory intent is necessary when the law is “overtly discriminatory” on its face.  
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 n.10 (1985). 
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A.  The Tension Between Anti-discrimination and Government Regulation 
Like any principle that seeks to address the problem of discrimi-
nation, the Paradigm confronts a tension:  regulation for the public 
good is an unavoidable fact of modern societies, yet any attempt to le-
gislate in a given area will single out some groups and not others.195  As 
the Court once famously put it, “[c]lassification is the essence of all 
legislation . . . .”196  A child-labor law, for example, singles out employ-
ers of children below a certain age rather than all employers general-
ly.  Likewise, a statutory speed limit treats speeding vehicles differently 
from slower ones. 
In the arbitration area, the Paradigm resolves this tension in favor 
of a principle of strict equality:  only laws that apply across the board to 
“any contract” will survive preemptive scrutiny.197  The Paradigm there-
by takes the anti-discrimination injunction quite literally, as a strong 
anti-differentiation principle.  It permits states to regulate arbitration 
only so long as they do so in the image of Lady Justice—in a way that is 
utterly blind to the very object of legislation.198  Not unlike the “sepa-
rate but equal” rationale of Plessy v. Ferguson,199 the Paradigm privileges 
formal over substantive equality.200  As more than one frustrated state 
judge has observed, this has enabled the Paradigm to maintain “an 
intellectual detachment from reality.”201 
But in its zeal to place arbitration on an equal “footing” with all 
other contracts, the Paradigm ignores the inequalities inherent in the 
use of arbitration agreements by big business against the proverbial 
“little guy”—victims of predatory lending, employment discrimination, 
and the like.  Many state laws that the FAA currently preempts are 
 
195 See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 
CALIF. L. REV. 341, 343 (1949); see also Peter Westen, The Meaning of Equality in Law, 
Science, Math, and Morals:  A Reply, 81 MICH. L. REV. 604, 620 (1983).  
196 Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 967 (1982). 
197 See supra notes 59-69 and accompanying text. 
198 See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987) (“A court may not, then, in as-
sessing the rights of litigants to enforce an arbitration agreement, construe that agree-
ment in a manner different from that in which it otherwise construes nonarbitration 
agreements under state law.”); cf. McGuinness & Karr, supra note 180, at 84 (arguing that 
in order to be consistent with the FAA, a court “may not even consider the fact that a 
contract to arbitrate is at issue in assessing whether the agreement is unconscionable”).  
199 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
200 See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 386 (3d ed. 2005) 
(describing the Plessy decision as betraying a “studied ignorance (or disregard) of the 
realities of life in the South”). 
201 Lombardi I, 886 P.2d 931, 940 (Mont. 1994) (Trieweiler, J., specially concur-
ring), vacated, 515 U.S. 1129 (1995). 
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seeking to address precisely these concerns, not by banning 
arbitration outright but by targeting discrete problem areas.  For ex-
ample, some states outlaw arbitration clauses only when imposed on es-
pecially vulnerable parties such as wage laborers and small business 
owners.202  Others require arbitration clauses to be typed in bold or ca-
pitalized letters in order to promote knowing and voluntary assent.203  
Still others have attempted to police the arbitration process:  for exam-
ple, some states have required arbitration providers to disclose conflicts 
of interest or otherwise to comply with state ethical standards.204  The 
Paradigm is fundamentally incapable of distinguishing between these 
laws and cruder variants such as an Alabama law that imposed a state-
wide restriction on all predispute arbitration agreements.205  The Para-
digm has no analytical apparatus with which to weigh the gravity and 
sincerity of a state’s regulatory interest against the strength of its own 
anti-discrimination mandate.  And in applying the single-out/general 
test, the Court has shown little inclination to think outside the zero-sum 
box—to consider whether and how constraining arbitration might ac-
tually restore its legitimacy in the eyes of the public and thereby further, 
rather than foil, any so-called “national policy favoring arbitration.”206 
Instead, the Paradigm effectuates what Justice Scalia has described 
as “a permanent, unauthorized eviction of state-court power” to legis-
late in the arbitration area.207  States may not so much as “attempt[] to 
undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements.”208  This has 
understandably led consumer advocates, reformers, and other 
 
202 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1298.7 (West 2007) (voiding certain arbitra-
tion provisions in construction contracts); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-2(c)(8) (2007) (void-
ing arbitration clauses in residential real estate agreements unless all signatories initial 
the clauses); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(2)(c) (2007) (voiding arbitration agree-
ments in insurance and annuity contracts except between insurance companies); TEX. 
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 171.002(a)–(b) (West 2005) (voiding arbitration 
clauses in contracts for the sale of goods worth less than $50,000 unless the parties 
agree in writing and their attorneys sign the agreement).  
203 E.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7191 (West 1995); MO. ANN. STAT. § 435.460 
(West 1992); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2602.02 (2008).  
204 E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1281.85(a), 1281.92(b) (West 2007). 
205 ALA. CODE § 8-1-41(3) (1993), preemption recognized by Allied-Bruce Terminix 
Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 278-81 (1995). 
206 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). 
207 Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 285 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
208 Southland, 465 U.S. at 16 (emphasis added); see also id. at 11 (“We see nothing 
in the Act indicating that the broad principle of enforceability is subject to any addi-
tional limitations under state law.”). 
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opponents of arbitration to abandon hope in the Paradigm.209  Rather 
than ask whether there might be principled ways to limit or salvage 
the Paradigm, they have largely looked to other strategies. 
One such strategy has been to argue that the FAA should not 
preempt any state law.  For example, the weight of scholarly opinion is 
that Congress originally intended the FAA as a set of procedural rules 
to govern the enforcement of arbitration agreements in federal court, 
not as an exercise of Congress’s substantive lawmaking power under 
the Commerce Clause.210  This has led scholars such as David Schwartz 
to contend that “FAA preemption is unconstitutional”211 and thus that 
the Court should forthwith jettison the better part of its existing FAA 
preemption jurisprudence.212  Not surprisingly, the Court has shown 
little receptivity to this suggestion.213 
Another strategy has been to attempt to shrink the FAA’s 
preemptive shadow—either through congressional amendment or 
through parallel federal legislation that would supersede the FAA in 
certain industry-specific contexts.  In 2009 alone, numerous bills to 
this effect were introduced and reintroduced in Congress.214  The 
most ambitious and recent of these was the highly controversial 
 
209 See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 
SUP. CT. REV. 331, 402 (“If we are to have sound arbitration law, there is no place to 
look for it except in the halls of Congress.”). 
210 See, e.g., MACNEIL, supra note 81, at 87-147; David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federal-
ism Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation:  The Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter–Spring 2004, at 5, 18.  But see Drahozal, supra note 
17, at 105 (noting that “there are ‘strong indications’ in the legislative history that the 
drafters of the FAA intended it to apply in state court”). 
211 Schwartz, Power of Congress, supra note 16, at 542.   
212 See Schwartz, supra note 210, at 7, 54.  
213 In amicus briefs to the Court, Schwartz and others have advocated overruling 
the seminal Southland decision, which paved the way for FAA preemption.  See Allied-
Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995) (describing the amicus 
brief filed by some twenty state attorneys general); Brief for Law Professors as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 1, Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 
(2003) (No. 02-6034).  The Court rejected this argument in Allied-Bruce but did not 
reach the issue in Bazzle. 
214 See, e.g., Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010, H.R. 3326, 111th 
Cong. § 8116 (2009) (enacted); Predatory Mortgage Lending Practices Reduction Act, 
H.R. 2108, 111th Cong. § 5 (2009); Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act, 
H.R. 1728, 111th Cong. § 206(a) (2009); Servicemembers Access to Justice Act of 2009, 
S. 263, 111th Cong. § 3; Servicemembers Access to Justice Act of 2009, H.R. 1474, 
111th Cong. § 3; Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act, S. 512, 111th Cong. § 3 
(2009); Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act of 2009, H.R. 1237, 111th Cong. § 2; 
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931, 111th Cong. § 3; Arbitration Fairness Act of 
2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 4; Consumer Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 991, 111th 
Cong. § 2.  
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Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009 (AFA).215  With one or two notable 
exceptions,216 however, these congressional initiatives have all lan-
guished in committee without coming close to a formal vote. 
Perhaps one explanation for why these proposed solutions have 
failed to gain traction is that they threaten to send the pendulum swing-
ing to the opposite extreme.  Rather than seek a careful balancing of 
state and federal interests,217 for example, Schwartz seeks nothing less 
than to “correct” the Court’s “federalism mistakes” by returning to an 
originalist interpretation of the FAA.218  And although congressional 
efforts have not sought quite the same overhaul of FAA preemption 
law, legislative intervention by its nature paints in broad strokes.  The 
AFA, for instance, purported to invalidate all predispute agreements 
to arbitrate (1) employment, consumer, or franchise disputes and (2) 
disputes “arising under any statute intended to protect civil rights.”219  
There are surely reasons to be especially concerned about the use and 
abuse of arbitration agreements in these contexts.  But a complete 
ban on such broadly worded subject areas takes what Rutledge has de-
scribed as a “meat cleaver” approach to “an issue that requires a scal-
pel.”220  As but one example, consider that when the employee is a 
sought-after, high-level executive or the employer is a struggling start-
 
215 See S. 931, 111th Cong. § 3 (proposing a ban on arbitration of employment, 
consumer, franchise, and civil rights disputes); see also Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, 
H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 4 (same). 
216 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1226 (2006) (permitting only postdispute arbitration 
agreements in the context of motor vehicle franchise contracts); Department of De-
fense Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-118, § 8116(a), 123 Stat. 3409, 3454-55 
(2009) (prohibiting contractors who receive funds under the Act from requiring em-
ployees and independent contractors to arbitrate Title VII, sexual harassment, and 
similar disputes).  
217 Justice Stevens sketched out an example of such an approach in his dissent 
from Southland.  See infra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.  Stevens argued that 
because legality of object is an essential element of any valid contract, states should 
retain at least some ability to regulate arbitration agreements through legislation.  See 
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 20 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  In his view, preserving some state authority was particularly war-
ranted in Southland given (1) the importance of franchise relationships to the state, 
(2) the power imbalance between franchisors and franchisees, and (3) the state law’s 
legitimate remedial goals.  Id.  Schwartz rejects this mediative approach, however, 
because it “assum[es] that the FAA creates a substantive right enforceable in state 
court.”  Schwartz, supra note 210, at 50.   
218 Schwartz, supra note 210, at 16; see also Pittman, supra note 18, at 798. 
219 Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 4. 
220 Peter B. Rutledge, The Case Against the Arbitration Fairness Act, DISP. RESOL. 
MAG., Fall 2009, at 4, 7.  Like me, Rutledge urges a more “calibrated solution” to the 
problem of overpreemption.  Id. 
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up, a complete ban on arbitration clauses in employment contracts 
may wreak the same type of unfairness that the AFA seeks to undo.221  
In these situations, the so-called “Arbitration Fairness Act” begins to 
look less like a remedial bill and more like an unfair burden on free-
dom of contract.222 
In contrast to these approaches, judges are increasingly searching 
for equilibrium.  For his part, Justice Stevens has advocated applying a 
certain degree of “scrutin[y]” and independent “judgment” to the FAA 
preemption analysis, especially where state remedial statutes are 
involved.223  Rather than relying on “sterile generalization,” he stressed 
the importance of considering factors such as the state’s regulatory int-
erests and “the substance of the transaction at issue,” not just its form.224  
Similarly, Justice O’Connor has faulted the Court’s rigid preemption 
tests for unnecessarily “displac[ing] many state statutes carefully cali-
brated to protect consumers.”225  For these and other jurists, the FAA’s 
anti-discrimination ambitions do not necessarily preclude regulating 
arbitration in the service of other, more pressing public values. 
These concerns have so far found little voice in the Paradigm, 
however.  The current framework is woefully indifferent to the states’ 
regulatory interests—let alone the need for a balance between those 
interests and the costs they impose on arbitration.  Is there a better 
way to reconcile the federal and state interests at stake in FAA 
preemption, one that facilitates careful analysis in the form of case-by-
case judicial scrutiny?  The accumulated learning in the anti-
discrimination area suggests an answer. 
 
221 See E. Gary Spitko, Exempting High-Level Employees and Small Employers from Legis-
lation Invalidating Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
591, 652-53 (2009). 
222 Similarly, although it has been noted that franchisees have less bargaining 
power than franchisors, it is difficult to appreciate why this alone should require validly 
negotiated arbitration agreements between such parties to be voided in all cases.  Un-
like employees and consumers, franchisees tend to be businesses—businesses that in 
turn employ individuals and provide services to consumers.  See Note, Arbitration—
Congress Considers Bill to Invalidate Pre-Dispute Arbitration Clauses for Consumers, Employees, 
and Franchisees, 121 HARV. L. REV. 2262, 2267-68 (2008). 
223 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 20 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
224 Id. 
225 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 282 (1995) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring).  Other courts have taken into consideration the gravity of 
state interests when analyzing complex preemption cases that are not straightforwardly 
resolvable under current FAA jurisprudence.  See, e.g., Saturn Distrib. Corp. v. Williams, 
905 F.2d 719, 728 (4th Cir. 1990) (Widener, J., dissenting); Flores v. Superior Court, 
No. B168327, 2003 WL 22963075, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2003). 
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B.  Justified Discrimination 
As we saw, the Paradigm resolves the tension between equal op-
portunity for arbitration and regulation for the public good by choos-
ing the former over the latter.  By contrast, anti-discrimination law 
takes a more balanced approach, one that distinguishes between dis-
crimination simpliciter and unjustified discrimination.  It understands 
that, without a threshold tolerance for some forms of de jure discrim-
ination, “effective regulation in the public interest could not be pro-
vided, however essential that regulation might be.”226  Perfect equality, 
in other words, is almost certainly dystopic.227 
Anti-discrimination law therefore wisely resists a blanket rule 
against classification.  In the equal protection context, this is captured 
in the well-known concepts of “suspect” and “quasi-suspect” classifica-
tions.  To say that a distinction drawn on the face of a statute is “sus-
pect” rather than “forbidden” serves to remind us that the real issue is 
not whether a law singles out a particular class but rather why it does 
so.228  This leaves open the possibility that the classification might be 
justified—for instance, where it is not the result of invidious motives 
or where it serves a weighty public purpose. 
For example, even while applying heightened scrutiny, the Court 
has upheld a variety of statutes in the gender context that single out 
women for differential treatment.229  In Califano v. Webster, the Court 
upheld a Social Security Act provision that calculated benefits for men 
and women differently because the provision did not reflect “‘tradi-
tional [and inaccurate] way[s] of thinking about females’”230 but ra-
ther sought to compensate for the “long history of discrimination 
against women.”231  Similarly, in Schlesinger v. Ballard, the Court denied 
 
226 Kotch v. Bd. of River Port Pilot Comm’rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947).   
227 See Brest, supra note 114, at 15 (“A flat prohibition of race-dependent decisions 
provides as much assurance as possible against discrimination, but at the cost of prec-
luding what may be thought to be desirable uses of race . . . .”).  
228 See, e.g., Perry, supra note 140, at 1046. 
229 See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (California statutory 
rape law that only applied to males); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (Social 
Security Act provision for calculating wages, partially based on gender); Schlesinger v. 
Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (law treating male and female Navy officers differently); 
Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (Florida property tax statute that treated widows 
and widowers differently). 
230 430 U.S. at 320 (quoting Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223 (1977)); see 
also Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 71-72 (1981) (upholding a gender-based classifi-
cation that was not “unthinking[]” but instead the product of “studied choice”).  
231 Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. at 317. 
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an equal protection challenge to a naval discharge statute that applied 
different termination criteria to males and females.232  Rather than 
“archaic and overbroad generalizations” about women, the statute was 
grounded in the “demonstrable fact” that female officers had fewer 
opportunities than their male counterparts to compile favorable ser-
vice records.233  The plain import of these cases and others like them is 
that gender-based classifications may sometimes be justified if they are 
not based on odious assumptions about a woman’s place in society. 
In the Title VII context, the “bona fide occupational qualification” 
(BFOQ) defense serves as a functional analog to the “quasi-suspect” 
classification standard.  The defense allows private employers to dis-
criminate on the basis of a protected characteristic other than race if 
they can prove that possession of the protected trait is “reasonably 
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or 
enterprise.”234  In Dothard v. Rawlinson, the Court used the BFOQ 
defense to uphold an explicit restriction on hiring women as guards 
in an all-male maximum security prison.235  The Court reasoned that 
the hiring policy did not represent an “artificial, arbitrary, and 
unnecessary barrier[] to employment”236 predicated on “stereotypical 
assumptions” about a woman’s ability to perform on the job.237  
Instead, the policy merely reflected the perils of life in the prison, 
supported by testimony that (1) twenty percent of prisoners had been 
sex offenders, (2) “rampant violence” was commonplace, and (3) 
female guards would not physically be able to maintain order as 
effectively as their male counterparts.238  Considerations of safety and 
effective job performance, in other words, trumped a rule of absolute 
equal treatment.239 
 
232 419 U.S. at 510. 
233 Id. at 508. 
234 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2006). 
235 See 433 U.S. 321, 366-37 (1977). 
236 Id. at 328 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)). 
237 Id. at 334.   
238 Id. at 334-35. 
239 One can quibble with whether these exceptions should ever (and do ever) suc-
ceed in practice, especially in contexts such as race or gender.  But this objection has 
more to do with the factual context at issue than with the basic theoretical apparatus.  
In theory, each of the anti-discrimination frameworks I discuss unmistakably recognizes 
that classifications along otherwise impermissible lines must sometimes be tolerated in 
order to achieve more pressing public interests.  The fact that some contexts rarely pre-
sent any reasons to tolerate discrimination does not invalidate that theory.  Nor does it 
necessarily cast doubt on the soundness of such reasons in the arbitration context.  
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The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which en-
deavors among other things to eliminate discrimination in world 
trade, takes a similar approach.240  GATT Article XX permits inten-
tional discrimination by member states against the goods of other 
contracting states in a finite set of circumstances.241  These circums-
tances all have to do with regulation in the public interest—for exam-
ple, to “protect public morals”; “to protect human, animal, or plant 
life”; or “to secure compliance with [other] laws or regulations” not 
inconsistent with GATT.242  Moreover, the so-called “chapeau” of Ar-
ticle XX makes clear that the exceptions may not be invoked to shield 
“arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.”243  In other words, the ex-
ceptions apply only when the discrimination is defensible in light of 
competing values.244 
Unlike these anti-discrimination regimes, the Paradigm’s “single 
out” rule assumes there is never a reason to discriminate purposefully 
against arbitration.  To use the vocabulary of equal protection, this ef-
fectively makes arbitration not just a “suspect” class but rather a “for-
bidden” class—a class about which no distinctions may be drawn.245  
To call this a “hyper-demanding”246 standard, as some scholars have, 
seems almost an understatement.  For as a standard of nondiscrimina-
tion, the Paradigm provides more protection to arbitration than the 
Equal Protection Clause and the Civil Rights Acts afford to gender 
and to some degree even race.  Gerald Gunther once said of the strict 
scrutiny test that it is “‘strict’ in theory and fatal in fact.”247  The Para-
 
240 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, A11, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194, 196 [hereinafter GATT]. 
241 See id. art. XX. 
242 Id. art. XX(a), (b), (d).  Some GATT side agreements contain similar public 
policy exceptions.  See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures, art. 2.1, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493, 494 (permitting countries to take 
measures that protect human life and health); Agreement on Technical Barriers to 
Trade, art. 2.2, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120, 121 (identifying countervailing values 
such as the protection of human health or the environment as legitimate grounds for 
discrimination). 
243 See GATT, supra note 240, art. XX. 
244 See id. 
245 See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 195, at 354.  
246 Edward Brunet, The Appropriate Role of State Law in the Federal Arbitration System:  
Choice and Preemption, in ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA 63, 69 (Edward Brunet et al. 
eds., 2006).  Brunet notes further that the “singling out” test “has no place in the nor-
mal arsenal of preemption inquiries.”  Id. 
247 Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword:  In Search of Evolving Doc-
trine on a Changing Court:  A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).  
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digm topples this standard in the preemption context by making dis-
crimination against arbitration both fatal in theory and fatal in fact. 
For these reasons, and consistent with what I have explained to be 
arbitration’s “suspect” status, I argue that the Paradigm should no 
longer preempt all enforcement-impeding state laws that target arbi-
tration on their face.  Instead, at the upper limit it should consider 
such laws as suspect—as only potentially tainted by the type of unjusti-
fied discrimination that the FAA was designed to remedy.248  But arbi-
tration’s “suspect” status also means that such laws must be scrutinized 
more than laws that seek to regulate other types of agreements—what 
one judge tellingly described as “unprotected” contracts.249  For no 
matter how rational, even arbitration-neutral state laws are suspicious 
because the Court fears that they might rest on negative stereotypes of 
the sort that continue to invoke a parade of horribles in the legal and 
popular imagination.250  The Court’s own about-face in the nonarbi-
trability area suggests “how tightly impulses hostile to arbitration must 
be constrained in order to remain faithful to Congress’s mandate.”251 
The approach I advocate would enable states to honor the FAA’s 
anti-discrimination mandate without abandoning all initiatives that 
single out arbitration.  It would open up a precious foothold for res-
toring the federal/state balance in the arbitration area where one has 
seemed impossible for quite some time.252  This foothold, moreover, 
would not depend on potentially disastrous amendments to the FAA253 
or on rolling back the Court’s FAA jurisprudence to the status quo 
prior to 1967, the year in which the Court vested FAA section 2 with 
substantive preemptive power.254  My suggested approach also offers a 
way for those who believe that the Court erred in Southland to find in 
the anti-discrimination model a certain critical moment—a way of 
 
248 See also Edward Brunet, The Minimal Role of Federalism and State Law in Arbitra-
tion, 8 NEV. L.J. 326, 328 (2007) (arguing that in determining whether the FAA 
preempts state law, “courts should look for suspect state laws that prevent the fulfill-
ment of the core policies underlying federal arbitration law”). 
249 See Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1120 (1st Cir. 1989). 
250 See supra notes 2-9 and accompanying text. 
251 Connolly, 883 F.2d at 1119 n.2. 
252 Even those like Stephen Hayford and Alan Palmiter, who argue that state arbi-
tration law has an interstitial role to play in the Court’s ambitious preemption pro-
gram, would agree that the Paradigm almost completely forecloses state regulation of 
both “front end” and “back end” issues.  See, e.g., Hayford & Palmiter, supra note 29, at 
205; Hayford, supra note 17, at 75. 
253 See supra notes 219-22 and accompanying text. 
254 See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967). 
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holding the Court to the full implications of its own (arguably mista-
ken) interpretation of the FAA. 
Finally, my approach is not inconsistent with the basic thrust of the 
Court’s existing FAA jurisprudence.  The Court’s core concern has al-
ways been with laws or legal principles that “take[] [their] meaning 
precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue”255—that is, 
laws that can be traced back to unfounded biases against arbitration 
qua arbitration.256  Although the Court has sometimes warned that the 
FAA categorically “foreclose[s] state legislative attempts to undercut 
the enforceability of arbitration agreements,”257 at other times it has 
spoken in less sweeping terms, suggesting that the true problem lies 
with state laws that discriminate against arbitration for no good reason: 
What States may not do is decide that a contract is fair enough to enforce 
all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair enough to enforce its 
arbitration clause.  The [FAA] makes any such state policy unlawful, for 
that kind of policy would place arbitration clauses on an unequal “foot-
ing,” directly contrary to the [FAA]’s language and Congress’ intent.
258
 
If I am correct that the Court’s FAA jurisprudence accords arbitra-
tion agreements more than the baseline constitutional protection af-
forded to all contracts, but something less than the absolute protection 
that would be accorded to a forbidden class, what level of “scrutiny” 
should be used to determine whether discrimination against arbitra-
tion agreements is consistent with the FAA?  My purpose in this Article 
is not to argue for a precise standard of FAA scrutiny.  Rather, it is to 
suggest that any level of scrutiny is better than the current state of no 
scrutiny at all.  For now, the important point is that whether a law “sin-
gles out” arbitration should not be the end but rather the beginning of 
the analysis—an analysis that should balance the Paradigm’s anti-
discrimination mandate against competing state interests. 
C.  Potential Objections 
Before illustrating how these insights could be used to resolve 
concrete preemption issues, I pause here to address three common 
critiques of the anti-discrimination model that I have so far developed.  
 
255 Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987). 
256 See supra Section II.A.  As I explained in Section II.B, the Court has more re-
cently scrutinized even perfectly reasonable generalizations about arbitration on the 
theory that they, too, might conceal a bias against arbitration. 
257 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984). 
258 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995). 
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The first is that, even if the FAA’s purpose is to reverse only unjusti-
fied hostility toward arbitration, there are good policy grounds to 
adopt a bright-line rule of preemption for all state laws that single out 
arbitration.  By contrast, a case-by-case approach of the sort I advocate 
would make the FAA preemption analysis unnecessarily complicated 
and time consuming, thereby inviting abuse. 
Policy considerations, however, actually militate in the opposite 
direction:  toward more nuance and refinement in the preemption 
analysis.  Obstacle preemption is not a question capable of being re-
solved “in the abstract,”259 based on the form rather than the substance 
of the state law at issue; instead, it requires a careful consideration of 
“the relationship between state and federal laws as they are interpreted 
and applied, not merely as they are written.”260  Moreover, in practice, 
[o]bstacle-preemption claims are among the most difficult defenses for 
the person claiming that an obstacle exists.  The challenger must show 
the specific federal objective was selected by Congress and that the par-
ticular state law was inconsistent with it.  Very persuasive advocates who 
assert the preemption defense must enlist the judge to discern the pur-
poses of the state law and the federal law in the same manner in which 
the advocate sees those purposes.
261
 
From this perspective, the single-out/general test dramatically simpli-
fies the ordinarily complex obstacle-preemption analysis.  My ap-
proach merely restores a baseline sophistication to that analysis in the 
arbitration context. 
The second type of critique is to question the practicality of an in-
tent-based FAA preemption test.262  But obstacle-preemption analysis 
already requires considering the intention behind a state statute and 
whether it conflicts with the purpose of the related federal statute.263  
Moreover, scholars have advocated precisely this type of inquiry in the 
FAA preemption context.264  Judges frustrated with the limitations of 
 
259 Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151, 195 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting 
Alascom, Inc. v. FCC, 727 F.2d 1212, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1984)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
260 Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977). 
261 JAMES T. O’REILLY, FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW 75 (2006) 
(footnotes omitted). 
262 I address this criticism in more detail elsewhere.  See Aragaki, supra note 27 
(manuscript Section III.A). 
263 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5.2.5 at 414, 415-16 (3d 
ed. 2006); O’REILLY, supra note 261, at 75.  
264 Consider the seminal case of Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 
(1996), in which the Court held that the FAA preempted a Montana law requiring ar-
bitration clauses to be printed in underlined capital letters on the contract’s front 
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the Paradigm have also pointed to the countervailing values embodied 
in state legislation as a reason to avoid preemption.265  And because 
arbitration is a “matter of consent, not coercion,” in certain circums-
tances it is well established that the intent of the contracting parties 
determines whether the FAA preempts state law.266 
The third and strongest objection is that the plain language of the 
FAA mandates a rule of absolute nondiscrimination.  Recall that section 
2 provides for arbitration agreements to be “valid, irrevocable, and en-
forceable” unless there are “grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract.”267  Enforcement-impeding laws that single 
out arbitration do not, by definition, fit within this so-called “savings 
clause.”  Thus, regardless of whether they justifiably discriminate against 
arbitration, all such laws appear inconsistent with the text of the FAA.  
Although this textual argument has a certain appeal, it does not provide 
the best interpretation of section 2 for the following reasons. 
First, the well-established public policy defense to contract 
formation268 constitutes a ground for the revocation of “any contract.”  
It follows that courts should be entitled to apply this defense without 
offending the FAA.269  For instance, if a state statute makes it illegal to 
print arbitration clauses in anything other than underlined capital 
letters, nothing in the plain language of section 2 should prevent courts 
from using the public policy defense to deny enforcement of non-
conforming clauses.  The bare words of section 2, therefore, do not 
unmistakably require the preemption of enforcement-impeding laws 
that single out arbitration. 
Nonetheless, as a practical matter, this creates a loophole that 
would allow states to use the letter of section 2 to do an end run around 
the FAA.  As the Court explained in its watershed Southland opinion, if 
 
page.  Many scholars have criticized Casarotto on the ground that the Court should 
have factored in the purpose of the Montana notice provision, which was merely to 
“make sure that its citizens knew when an arbitration provision was included in a con-
tract.”  Moses, supra note 64, at 542.  Because the interests served by the Montana law 
were consistent with the FAA, they argued, the law should not have been preempted.  
See, e.g., Brunet, supra note 246, at 71; Moses, supra note 64, at 542; Sternlight, supra 
note 18, at 667. 
265 See supra note 225 and accompanying text. 
266 See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 
468, 479 (1989); see also Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 
63-64 (1995). 
267 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
268 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981); 5 RICHARD A. LORD, 
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 12:1 (4th ed. 2009). 
269 See, e.g., Feeney v. Dell Inc., 908 N.E.2d 753, 768 (Mass. 2009). 
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the public policy defense were left intact, “states could wholly eviscerate 
[the] congressional intent to place arbitration agreements ‘upon the 
same footing as other contracts,’ simply by passing statutes” targeting 
arbitration for unfavorable treatment.270  Thus, the real reason the FAA 
preempts state law has more to do with considerations of policy and 
purpose than with fealty to the statutory text.  And as explained above, 
in Southland, the Court described those purposes using a textbook 
metaphor for equal opportunity, suggesting that the anti-discrimination 
model is consistent with the basic foundations of FAA preemption. 
Second, the historical record suggests that proponents of the FAA 
never intended to preclude all manner of laws that singled out 
arbitration.  Thus, even while it sought to make arbitrable “every other 
possible subject of controversy in contract and tort,”271 the New York 
arbitration law on which the FAA was based prohibited the submission 
to arbitration of any “controversy [that] arises respecting a claim to an 
estate in real property, in fee or for life.”272  Similarly, the Pennsylvania 
arbitration statute in effect in 1924 prohibited arbitration of disputes 
arising out of a “contract for personal services.”273  Likewise, many 
state arbitration statutes patterned after the New York arbitration law 
excluded labor arbitrations from within their scope.274  These provi-
sions were undoubtedly known to the reformers, yet there is no indi-
cation in the historical record that the reformers perceived them as 
antithetical to the FAA.275  In short, the history of the FAA, like its text, 
 
270 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 n.11 (1984) (citation omitted) 
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924)). 
271 Wheless, supra note 96, at 222. 
272 New York Civil Practice Act § 1448, cl. 2 (1928), reprinted in CLEVENGER’S PRACTICE 
MANUAL OF NEW YORK 682-83 ( Joseph R. Clevenger ed., 1928); see also WIS. STAT. 
§ 298.01(1)(b) (1927) (proscribing arbitration in cases relating to real estate); STURGES, 
supra note 85, §§ 88–140 (reprinting relevant portions of state statutes in effect as of 1930). 
273 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 606a-1 to -2 (Supp. 1928). 
274 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 4294–4301 (1928); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 
§§ 1280–1293 (1927); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 405–422 (1932); An Act to Make Enfor-
ceable Agreements for the Arbitration of Disputes, 1929 N.H. Laws 172, 172-74; An Act 
to Make Valid and Enforceable Written Provisions or Agreements for the Arbitration 
of Disputes, 1929 R.I. Pub. Laws 292, 292-98.  The New York statute did not, however, 
provide such an exception. 
275 Indeed, they were challenged—albeit unsuccessfully—as arbitrary and unrea-
sonable classifications in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.  See, e.g., Pac. Indem. 
Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 25 F.2d 930, 932 (9th Cir. 1928); Katakura & Co. v. Vogue 
Silk Hosiery Co., 15 Pa. D. & C. 389, 393 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1931), aff’d, 161 A. 529, 530 (Pa. 
1932).  Even after such statutes were upheld, reformers did not appear to have sought 
state legislative amendment.   
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is not unavoidably inconsistent with the proposition that states may 
single out arbitration agreements in certain contexts. 
Finally, bear in mind that my overall argument is built on the 
Court’s FAA preemption jurisprudence rather than on the FAA itself.  
As noted above, that jurisprudence does not necessarily follow from 
anything in the FAA’s language or legislative history. 
D.  Application 
Given a statute that singles out a suspect or quasi-suspect class, 
equal protection jurisprudence applies heightened scrutiny to deter-
mine whether the facial classification is justifiable.  That justification 
turns on (1) the gravity of the state interests favoring discrimination 
and (2) the fit between those interests and the means chosen to fur-
ther them.  A similar inquiry obtains in the Title VII context.  Pur-
suant to the BFOQ defense, an employer may discriminate on the ba-
sis of national origin or gender (but not race) if (1) the reason for the 
discrimination is important enough to touch the “essence of the busi-
ness”276 and (2) the regulation is “reasonably necessary” for that pur-
pose.277  By the same token, signatories to GATT are entitled to over-
ride the treaty’s nondiscrimination principle as long as any 
discriminatory measure both (1) serves substantial regulatory interests 
such as the protection of human or animal life and (2) is “necessary” 
to achieve those interests.278 
Distilling these precedents, I propose the following inquiry for 
determining whether the FAA preempts a state law that singles out 
arbitration:  First, the Paradigm should consider the gravity of the 
state interest behind the law.279  Second, it should inquire into the 
means/ends fit between those interests and the law as drafted.280 
As an example, consider the seminal case of Doctor’s Associates, Inc. 
v. Casarotto,281 in which franchisees sued the franchisor of a Subway 
chain for breach of contract and fraud.  The franchise agreement’s 
arbitration clause required the Montana-based franchisees to arbitrate 
 
276 Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971). 
277 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2006).  
278 GATT, supra note 240, art. XX(b). 
279 This is also consistent with Edward Brunet’s argument that FAA preemption 
should involve a consideration of both federal and state interests at stake.  See Brunet, 
supra note 248, at 328-29. 
280 Again, the precise standard of scrutiny to be applied in these inquiries is an is-
sue that I defer to another day.  See supra text following note 258. 
281 517 U.S. 681 (1996). 
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their claims in the franchisor’s home state of Connecticut.282  The 
franchisees were also required to pay half of the arbitration expenses 
(including the arbitrators’ fees and travel expenses), administrative 
charges of $150 per day, and a filing fee of up to $4,000.283 
At the time, Montana law imposed a statewide requirement that 
arbitration clauses be “typed in underlined capital letters on the first 
page of the contract,”284 regardless of the subject matter of the contract 
or the relationship between the contracting parties.  Because the 
parties’ agreement did not comply with this law, the franchisees argued 
that their promise to arbitrate was unenforceable.285  The Court held 
that the FAA preempted the Montana law because the law “singl[ed] 
out arbitration provisions for suspect status”286 and thereby placed 
them “on an unequal ‘footing’” relative to other agreements.287 
The Court was literally correct that Montana did not require other 
clauses in the contract likewise to be typed in underlined, capital letters 
in order to be enforceable.288  But is this the type of unequal treatment 
about which the FAA is (or should be) concerned?  Does it suggest any 
hostility or lingering anti-arbitration bias of the kind that the Court 
seeks to reverse?289  The Paradigm has no occasion to consider these 
questions because the fact that the law is enforcement impeding and 
singles out arbitration brings the inquiry to a screeching halt. 
An anti-discrimination approach would not necessarily arrive at 
the same conclusion.  To be sure, the classification drawn on the face 
of the statute would trigger a suspicion that the statute is singling out 
arbitration clauses because of problematic biases or generalizations 
about the arbitration process.  But there are arguably legitimate state 
interests behind the Montana law—interests that may have little to do 
with discrimination and more to do with protecting the unwary from 
unknowingly waiving constitutional rights that they do not expect 
 
282 See Lombardi I, 886 P.2d 931, 935 (Mont. 1994), vacated, 515 U.S. 1129 (1995). 
283 Id.  In addition, because Connecticut law governed the franchise agreement, 
the franchisees would have had to hire Connecticut counsel.  See id. 
284 Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 683 (quoting MONT. CODE. ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1995)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
285 Lombardi I, 886 P.2d at 933. 
286 Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687. 
287 Id. at 686 (quoting Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 
(1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
288 See id. at 687. 
289 David Schwartz raises this same question when distinguishing between hostility 
toward arbitration based on considerations of “jurisdiction and judicial administration” 
and of contract validity.  See Schwartz, supra note 210, at 52.   
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(and might not wish) to waive in this context.290  Moreover, the means 
chosen to further those interests do not appear excessive:  instead of 
invalidating all arbitration clauses, the law simply voids those that do 
not comply with relatively trivial notice requirements.291 
Alternatively, one might argue that the means chosen by the 
state legislature were in fact ill-fitting and overinclusive, for the law 
also voids nonconforming arbitration clauses between sophisticated 
parties—parties who, unlike the franchisees in Casarotto, would not 
need the benefit of the law and might very well use the inadvertent 
failure to comply with it as an excuse to avoid arbitration ex post.  
From this perspective, the law as drafted appears more suspicious 
than it otherwise would have if, for instance, it had been limited in 
scope to franchise agreements or other transactions known to 
involve pronounced disparities in bargaining power.  Whether these 
considerations are sufficient to suggest unjustified discrimination 
will ultimately depend on how closely the law is scrutinized under 
the test I propose.292 
IV.  UNDERPREEMPTION AND THE PROBLEM OF PRETEXT 
If the Paradigm applies an unyielding standard to state laws that 
single out arbitration, it retreats to the other extreme when it comes 
to generally applicable laws.  By and large, the Paradigm presumes 
that a state law or rule regulating contracts as a group does not ex-
press any hostility toward arbitration and for that reason is not 
preempted by the FAA.293  But as any student of anti-discrimination 
law will appreciate, it is entirely possible to apply a facially neutral law 
in discriminatory ways.  This introduces the problem of pretext:  the 
possibility that courts may be concealing lingering anti-arbitration bias 
behind the mask of “general” contract defenses.294  Preemption con-
cerns are just as salient here as they were in the case of statutes that 
single out arbitration.  Traditional conflict-preemption analysis re-
 
290 See Casarotto v. Lombardi (Lombardi II), 901 P.2d 596, 599 (Mont. 1995) (Lea-
phart, J., concurring), rev’d, 517 U.S. 681 (1996); Lombardi I, 886 P.2d at 935, 939, va-
cated, 515 U.S. 1129 (1995).   
291 Similarly, some have offered the law’s arguably slight impact on arbitration as a 
reason why the law should not have been preempted.  See, e.g., Hayford, supra note 17, 
at 71; Sternlight, supra note 18, at 667.   
292 Again, for reasons of economy I leave questions regarding the level of scrutiny 
for another day.   
293 See Figure 1, supra Section I.B.   
294 See, e.g., Rau, supra note 181, at 20, 21-22; Ware, supra note 73, at 1034. 
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quires courts to consider the relevant state and federal laws not just as 
they are written but also “as they are interpreted and applied.”295 
In this Part, I focus on enforcement-impeding laws that apply to 
all or substantially all contracts—in particular, the unconscionability 
defense.  My aim here is to challenge the inverse of the assumption 
considered in Part III, namely:  “[I]f [a state] law arose to govern is-
sues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of con-
tracts generally,” it is necessarily unproblematic from an anti-
discrimination perspective.296 
A.  Unconscionability and the “New Judicial Hostility” 
For some time, unconscionability functioned like a safety valve 
on FAA preemption, giving judges the flexibility to invalidate prob-
lematic arbitration agreements that legislatures could not regulate 
without running afoul of the single-out/general test.297  In recent 
years, however, academics and practitioners alike have suggested 
that the doctrine may be operating less as a shield against the Para-
digm’s relentless preemptive effect and more as a sword in the ser-
vice of a new but stealthful “judicial hostility” to arbitration.298 
In her study of unconscionability cases, for example, Susan Ran-
dall reports a tangible increase both in the frequency with which liti-
gants raise unconscionability challenges against arbitration agree-
ments and in the rate at which courts hold those agreements to be 
unconscionable.299  In the 2002 to 2003 period, Randall reports that 
68.5% of all unconscionability cases involved arbitration agreements, 
compared with just 14.8% twenty years earlier.300  In the same period, 
courts found 50.3% of the arbitration agreements to be unconsciona-
ble but only 25.6% of the nonarbitration agreements—a rate two 
 
295 Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977). 
296 Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987). 
297 See, e.g., Bruhl, supra note 168, at 1422; McGuinness & Karr, supra note 180, at 
61; Stempel, supra note 183, at 765-66. 
298 See Burton, supra note 30, at 489-500; Riske, supra note 31, at 600-01; Stempel, 
supra note 183, at 773-75.  See generally McGuinness & Karr, supra note 180, at 62 (ar-
guing that the FAA allows courts to apply general contract principles in a manner hos-
tile to arbitration agreements); Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and 
the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 185, 186 (2004) (arguing that judges 
perpetuate the historic hostility toward arbitration by “expand[ing] the doctrine of 
unconscionability . . . to revoke arbitration agreements”).   
299 See Randall, supra note 298, at 194-96. 
300 Id. 
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times higher for arbitration agreements.301  In a similar study, Aaron-
Andrew Bruhl observes that unconscionability-related arbitration cases 
increased year over year from less than 1% of all arbitration cases in 
1994 to more than 18% in 2007.302 
To be sure, a spike in numbers standing alone is hardly conclusive 
evidence of discriminatory treatment.  But there are other indications 
that anti-arbitration bias within the judiciary is alive and well.  Practi-
tioners have begun to accuse judges of “creat[ing] a new brand of un-
conscionability” that is “far more demanding” and “unique to arbitra-
tion.”303  Judges, too, have noted that their colleagues’ unconscion-
ability decisions are sometimes “written ostensibly to apply general 
principles of contract law, [but] they hold that an agreement to arbi-
trate may be unconscionable simply because it is an agreement to ar-
bitrate.”304  The empirical data, together with this qualitative evidence, 
have led some to suggest quite persuasively that “[m]any courts . . . se-
ize upon the unconscionability doctrine as a pretext to refuse en-
forcement” of arbitration agreements.305  I shall refer to such critics as 
the “pretextualists.” 
The problem of pretext has been a central theme in anti-
discrimination law.  In the equal protection context, for example, 
courts are keenly attuned to the danger that state actors might apply 
benign laws or rules in ways that betray “enmity or prejudice . . . and 
other improper influences and motives easy of concealment.”306  
Likewise, GATT provides that the Article XX exceptions should not 
be “applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary 
or unjustifiable discrimination . . . or a disguised restriction on inter-
national trade.”307 
By comparison, the Paradigm is naïve to these dangers.308  It can-
not discern discrimination in the case-by-case application of unconscio-
 
301 Id. at 194. 
302 Bruhl, supra note 168, at 1440.   
303 McGuinness & Karr, supra note 180, at 62.  
304 Gay v. CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369, 395 (3d Cir. 2007). 
305 Burton, supra note 30, at 500. 
306 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886). 
307 GATT, supra note 240, art. XX (emphasis added). 
308 See Burton, supra note 30, at 483 (observing that “[e]xisting case law does not 
resolve this tension”); Drahozal, supra note 41, at 411 (observing that “[l]ower courts 
generally have rejected” FAA preemption challenges to the application of a contract 
defense and that the Supreme Court “so far has not addressed the issue”); J. Maria 
Glover, Beyond Unconscionability:  Class Action Waivers and Mandatory Arbitration Agree-
ments, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1735, 1756-57 (2006) (considering claims that courts are apply-
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nability doctrine because the analysis stops at the question of whether 
the law is general or arbitration-specific; that is, the Paradigm’s single-
out/general test fails to pierce through the form of the law to consider 
how the law is being applied in substance.309  Thus, general contract de-
fenses such as unconscionability are immunized from further risk of 
preemption in the very first step of Drahozal’s four-step model of FAA 
preemption.310  Drahozal’s test accurately reflects the Paradigm’s (in-
accurate) assumption that “[i]f the law applies to contracts generally, 
it is not preempted.”311 
Even where one party explicitly argues that the lower court used 
unconscionability “in a manner ‘inherently hostile’ to arbitration,”312 
reviewing courts have been content to deflect the preemption chal-
lenge solely on the ground that unconscionability is part of the law of 
contracts.313  And while a few courts have been astute enough to ob-
serve that they may not “employ . . . general doctrines in ways that sub-
ject arbitration clauses to special scrutiny,”314 none has provided a 
meaningful test for discerning precisely when such scrutiny has been 
employed.  If the pretextualists are correct that the old judicial hostili-
ty is now masquerading behind the unconscionability doctrine, the 
Paradigm does not appear to be effective at uncloaking it.315 
 
ing unconscionability doctrine more strictly to class action waivers in arbitration 
agreements but concluding that FAA preemption is not “foolproof” and does not for-
bid the practice). 
309 See supra note 63. 
310 See Drahozal, supra note 41, at 407-08.   
311 Id.  Drahozal himself is more skeptical of this proposition.  He eventually asks 
whether, “as applied,” general contract law defenses might nonetheless be considered 
to single out arbitration.  Id. at 411.  
312 Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1152 (9th Cir. 2003). 
313 See, e.g., Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 857 (9th Cir. 2009) (hold-
ing that “‘because unconscionability is a generally applicable contract defense,’” it is 
never preempted (quoting Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 
988 (9th Cir. 2007))), cert. granted sub nom. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 130 S. 
Ct. 3322 (2010) (No. 09-0893); Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1170 
n.3 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting as “plainly without merit” an argument that California 
unconscionability precedents “impose[] a heightened standard for enforcement of 
arbitration agreements”); Hall v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 608 F. Supp. 2d 592, 597 (D.N.J. 
2009) (denying preemption challenge to unconscionability defense on the ground 
that courts have “routinely” held the defense to be generally applicable). 
314 Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 167 (5th 
Cir. 2004). 
315 Aaron-Andrew Bruhl offers another explanation for why reviewing courts have 
not scrutinized adverse unconscionability findings in the lower courts more aggressively.  
He argues that such courts might entertain “expressive” concerns about accusing a trial 
judge of misinterpreting, or perhaps even manipulating, the unconscionability doctrine 
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B.  “As Applied” Challenges and the Limits of the Single-Out/General Test 
In response to the Paradigm’s lackadaisical approach to these 
problems, pretextualists have sought more aggressively to infer judicial 
hostility toward arbitration by refocusing the single-out/general test at 
the level of application.316  From an anti-discrimination perspective, 
however, the test proves no more effective here than it did in the con-
text of the statutes considered in Part IV.  It makes no sense to say, for 
example, that courts may not “rely on the uniqueness of an agreement 
to arbitrate” when determining whether the agreement is uncon-
scionable.317  Or, to take a more extreme iteration, that “courts may not 
even consider the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue.”318  Un-
conscionability requires precisely the type of case-by-case determination 
about particular arbitration clauses that these rules purport to forbid.319  
It eschews standardized tests and instead requires courts to weigh indi-
vidualized factors such as “the commercial setting, purpose, and effect 
 
out of hostility toward arbitration.  See Bruhl, supra note 168, at 1454-55.  From a judi-
cial federalism perspective, Bruhl notes that these “expressive” concerns may be most 
pronounced when the Court is asked to review state supreme court decisions.  Id. 
316 See, e.g., Burton, supra note 30, at 483-85; McGuinness & Karr, supra note 180, 
at 84. 
317 Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987); accord Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. 
Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 n.3 (1996).  As noted above, these statements are dicta.  
See supra note 63. 
 The recent case of Gay v. CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369 (3d Cir. 2007), illustrates the 
absurdity of insisting that courts may not apply the unconscionability doctrine in a way 
that singles out arbitration contracts.  The consumer in that case, Mary Gay, credibly 
argued that her arbitration agreement was substantively unconscionable because it 
contained a class action ban that, for all practical purposes, rendered her small con-
sumer claim nonactionable.  Id. at 393.  But because this argument necessarily “re-
lie[d] on the uniqueness of the arbitration provision”—namely, the fact that it con-
tained a class action ban—the Third Circuit held that the FAA would preempt an 
unconscionability determination based on such an argument.  Id. at 395.   
318 McGuinness & Karr, supra note 180, at 84; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
at 4, Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Gentry, 552 U.S. 1296 (2008) (No. 07-0998) (cert. de-
nied) (arguing that the FAA should preempt a state court unconscionability finding 
because it “depend[s] on the fact that an arbitration agreement is at issue”).  To be 
sure, McGuinness and Karr recognize the tension inherent in this proposition and 
conclude, more or less consistent with the argument I seek to develop here, that “[t]he 
only apparent means of reconciling” the tension is to return to the fundamental anti-
discrimination purpose of the FAA:  “to ‘reverse centuries of judicial hostility to arbi-
tration agreements by placing them on equal footing with other contracts.’”  McGuin-
ness & Karr, supra note 180, at 78 (quoting Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 
482 U.S. 220, 225-26 (1987)).   
319 See, e.g., 2A LARY LAWRENCE, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
§ 2-302:27 (3d ed. 2008).   
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of the particular clause or contract” in question.320  Thus, if FAA 
preemption of a general contract defense were to hinge on whether 
application of the defense to an arbitration clause singles out that 
clause, no possible application would survive preemptive scrutiny.321 
A more promising approach may be to follow the Court’s admoni-
tion that judges may not “decide that a contract is fair enough to en-
force all its basic terms (price, service, credit), but not fair enough to 
enforce its arbitration clause.”322  Some pretextualists have taken this 
as a cue to compare the outcome of unconscionability challenges in ar-
bitration cases and in otherwise identical nonarbitration cases.  Thus, 
when a court finds unconscionable an arbitration clause that requires 
the consumer or employee to resolve disputes in a distant forum, but 
the same court “reach[es] a different conclusion” with regard to a 
contract that does not call for arbitration,323 some infer hostility from 
the bare fact of these disparate outcomes. 
But this line of inquiry, too, is fraught with complexity, because un-
conscionability analysis is itself notoriously opaque and vests a great 
deal of discretion in the trial judge.  This lack of transparency is precise-
ly what led scholars such as Arthur Leff to warn that the unconscionabil-
ity doctrine “make[s] the true bases of decisions more hidden” and al-
lows a court “to be nondisclosive about the basis of its decision even to 
itself.”324  Moreover, persuasive “apples-to-apples”325 comparisons be-
tween unconscionability determinations in arbitration and nonarbitra-
tion contexts are few and far between.326  Indeed, sometimes there is 
simply no relevant nonarbitration comparison point at all.327 
 
320 8 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 18:11 (4th ed. 2010); see also 
U.C.C. § 2-302(2) (2001); 2A LAWRENCE, supra note 319, § 2-302:104. 
321 Others before me have argued this point better than space permits me to do 
here.  See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 210, at 51.   
322 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995).  Like the state-
ments in Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9, and Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687 n.3, this, too, is dictum.  
See supra note 63.  Regardless, it is nonsensical.  As David Schwartz has observed, it is en-
tirely in keeping with the purpose of the unconscionability doctrine to decide that a par-
ticular arbitration clause is unfair (and to reform or void just that clause) even though 
remaining clauses in the container contract are not.  See Schwartz, supra note 210, at 51. 
323 See Randall, supra note 298, at 216; see also Burton, supra note 30, at 495. 
324 Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 
U. PA. L. REV. 485, 557 (1967).   
325 Bruhl, supra note 168, at 1450. 
326 I refer the reader to Bruhl’s more extended treatment of this point.  See id. at 
1449-52. 
327 See id. (“[S]ome contractual issues arise exclusively or nearly exclusively in the 
arbitration context, which means that there is no ready and obvious nonarbitration 
baseline . . . .”); Randall, supra note 298, at 218-20 (noting that the confidential nature 
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Nor would we necessarily wish to insist on parity in outcomes.  
The advantage of unconscionability is its context-specific policing of 
unfairness:  its ability to serve as a “safety net”328 in circumstances 
where unfairness would escape detection by more predictable bright-
line rules.  A test of outcome equivalence would not only be difficult 
to administer in practice, it would also straightjacket judges in a way 
that threatens to defeat the benefits of the unconscionability rule. 
Moreover, even if we were to agree that courts reach different 
conclusions about unconscionability in arbitration and nonarbitration 
cases, there may be perfectly reasonable explanations for these dis-
crepancies that have little to do with unjustified hostility.  For in-
stance, Randall takes issue with California courts that find forum-
selection clauses unconscionable in arbitration agreements but not in 
other agreements.329  But a closer look at these cases reveals a much 
more complex picture.  Both the arbitration and nonarbitration cases 
cited by Randall acknowledged that forum-selection clauses are prima 
facie valid and must be enforced unless unreasonable under the cir-
cumstances.330  Although it is possible to speculate that courts none-
theless applied this rule more rigorously to arbitration agreements, 
the unique facts of each case are quite consistent with the opposite 
conclusion.  Consider that Randall’s arbitration cases generally in-
volved extremely small claims when compared to the cost of traveling 
to the distant forum, together with other indicia of substantive un-
conscionability.331  By contrast, in Randall’s nonarbitration examples, 
 
of arbitration, which might be a factor in the unconscionability analysis, “has no exact 
analogue” in litigation). 
328 See generally Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability’s Safety Net Function, 58 
ALA. L. REV. 73 (2006) (arguing that flexibility and the lack of clear rules are strengths, 
not weaknesses, of the unconscionability doctrine).   
329 Randall, supra note 298, at 214-16. 
330 Although the standards employed in the arbitration and nonarbitration cases 
are similar, they are not identical.  In the arbitration cases Randall cites, the issue was 
always whether the forum-selection clause was substantively and procedurally uncons-
cionable.  See, e.g., Wilmot v. McNabb, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1210 (N.D. Cal. 2003).  In 
the nonarbitration cases, the question was whether the forum-selection clause was “un-
reasonable” under the test articulated in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 
10 (1972).  This is not necessarily a problem for Randall’s analysis, however, if it is just 
as difficult (or more difficult) to prove unconscionability as it is to prove unreasona-
bleness under the Bremen test.   
331 See Wilmot, 269 F. Supp. 2d at 1211 (finding unconscionable an arbitration 
clause that required an infirm elderly couple to arbitrate their claims in Colorado, 
even though they lived in California and the defendant had offices throughout the 
country); Comb v. Paypal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1177 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (holding 
unconscionable an arbitration clause that required nationwide customers to arbitrate 
in “PayPal’s backyard” and that also exhibited other indicia of one-sidedness); GMAC 
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the plaintiff either failed to adduce evidence that the forum-selection 
clause was substantively unconscionable or did not bother to argue 
the point.332 
These observations suggest that the single-out/general test is at 
best an imperfect surrogate for the real issue that troubles the pretex-
tualists.  That issue, to quote the California Supreme Court, is whether 
lower court judges are “us[ing] . . . such defenses [improperly] to dis-
criminate against arbitration clauses.”333  The pretextualists have simi-
larly framed the issue in terms of discrimination, but they stop short of 
building on this insight.334 
In the next section, I pick up where the pretextualists leave off.  
Continuing with unconscionability as an example, I ask whether look-
ing to the anti-discrimination paradigm can help us articulate a more 
cogent standard for determining when and why the FAA should 
preempt certain applications of general contract defenses. 
 
Commercial Fin. LLC v. Superior Court, No. B166070, 2003 WL 21398319, at *4 (Cal. 
Ct. App. June 18, 2003) (holding “[t]he combination of the New York forum selection 
clause and the New York choice of law provision” contained in an arbitration clause to 
be unconscionable as to a California clothing manufacturer); Stone v. Memberworks 
Inc., No. G030740, 2003 WL 21246771, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. May 30, 2003) (“To require 
a consumer in California, alleging a claim under California law, to arbitrate a dispute 
in Connecticut concerning one or two hundred dollars . . . is ‘overly harsh’ and ‘one-
sided.’”); Bolter v. Superior Court, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 888, 894 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding 
unconscionable a forum-selection provision that a “large international corporation” 
imposed on “small ‘Mom and Pop’ franchisees” as a condition of continuing their al-
most twenty-year-old franchise). 
332 See generally Net2Phone, Inc. v. Superior Court, 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 149, 153 (Ct. 
App. 2003) (holding that a New Jersey venue clause in a national company’s license 
agreement was not unreasonable simply because the agreement was presented on a 
“take it or leave it” basis); Intershop Commc’ns AG v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
847, 854 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding that a clause selecting Germany as the dispute reso-
lution forum was not unreasonable where the plaintiff made no showing that “substan-
tial justice could not be achieved” in Germany or that the clause was otherwise substan-
tively unconscionable).  In one case, the court understandably rejected a Canadian 
plaintiff’s claim that his Canadian insurance policy’s requirement to resolve disputes in 
Canada was unreasonable.  See generally Shepherd v. Dominion of Can. Gen. Ins. Co., 
No. D039718, 2003 WL 21388251 (Cal. Ct. App. June 17, 2003). 
333 Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1112-13 (Cal. 2005); accord 
Banc One Acceptance Corp. v. Hill, 367 F.3d 426, 432 (5th Cir. 2004); Bruhl, supra 
note 168, at 1451, 1454-55.   
334 McGuinness and Karr, for example, draw an explicit analogy between their criti-
que of California courts’ unconscionability decisions—which they claim ought to be 
preempted by the FAA—and an “as applied” challenge to a facially neutral law under the 
Equal Protection Clause.  See McGuinness & Karr, supra note 180, at 78 n.145; see also Bur-
ton, supra note 30, at 483; Randall, supra note 298, at 194; Riske, supra note 31, at 600-02. 
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C.  Proving Pretextual Discrimination 
Anti-discrimination law offers a helpful framework for approach-
ing the problem of underpreemption in part because it disaggregates 
two distinct paths to proving discriminatory treatment that the pre-
textualists have sometimes managed to conflate:  establishing invi-
dious motives and establishing disproportionate outcomes.  Statutory 
anti-discrimination law captures this distinction through the concepts 
of “disparate treatment” and “disparate impact” claims, respectively.335 
A claim of disparate treatment amounts to a claim of purposeful, 
unjustified discrimination.  Disparate impact, by contrast, represents a 
much more capacious view of discrimination that takes into account the 
accreted effects of unconscious prejudice and historical subordination 
that are beyond the control of any one actor.  In other words, disparate 
impact theory recognizes that unequal treatment may occur in the ab-
sence of purposeful or conscious misconduct—indeed, that sometimes 
the unintended and seemingly benign forms of discrimination are 
most in need of correction.336  Disparate impact theory therefore allows 
the trier of fact to infer discriminatory treatment from suspiciously 
unequal outcomes alone, regardless of the defendant’s motivation.337 
It is certainly possible to understand the pretextualists to be 
arguing that there is something inherently problematic when arbitra-
tion agreements are overrepresented year after year in the set of con-
tracts that courts deem unconscionable.  But such an argument would 
be seriously misconceived for a number of reasons.  First, it presup-
poses a more robust anti-discrimination agenda for the FAA—
something approaching an anti-subordination principle of the sort 
 
335 See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (ex-
plaining the difference between the two types of claims).  Many anti-discrimination 
scholars have questioned the salience of the treatment/impact distinction.  See, e.g., 
Sheila R. Foster, Causation in Antidiscrimination Law:  Beyond Intent Versus Impact, 41 
HOUS. L. REV. 1469, 1474-76, 1547-48 (2005); George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact, Dis-
crimination, and the Essentially Contested Concept of Equality, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2313, 
2314-22 (2006). 
336 See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430, 432 (1971) (holding in 
the Title VII context that “good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not 
redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in head-
winds’ for minority groups” or that “operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discri-
minatory employment practices”). 
337 Note that the disparate impact claim does not seek to rectify inequality in the 
outcomes themselves; rather, like the disparate treatment claim, it is at bottom a 
theory of unequal treatment.  See, e.g., Pamela L. Perry, Two Faces of Disparate Impact Dis-
crimination, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 523, 540-41 (1991). 
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used to justify disparate impact claims in the employment context.338  
Outside that context, not even racial minorities are entitled in the 
normal course to a finding of discrimination based solely on evidence 
of outcome disparities.339  Second, the default presumption in the em-
ployment discrimination area is that, in a world with no discrimina-
tion, the “work force [will be] more or less representative of the ra-
cial[, gender,] and ethnic composition of the population in the 
community from which employees are hired.”340  The same is not quite 
true with respect to arbitration agreements and the set of all uncons-
cionable agreements.  There are real disparities in bargaining power 
that frequently attend arbitration clauses held to be unconscionable—
disparities that serve as a compelling alternative explanation for the 
outcome discrepancies identified by Randall and others.341  Third, the 
FAA was designed to reverse the “hostility,”342 “enmity,”343 and “jealou-
sy”344 of the common law courts toward arbitration, not their unin-
tended failure to enforce predispute arbitration agreements with the 
same vigor they applied to other agreements.  It has therefore been 
understood as only “pre-emptive of state laws hostile to arbitration,”345 
as opposed to just any law that happens to impede the enforceability 
of arbitration agreements.  This, too, is consistent with my earlier de-
scription of the Paradigm as more akin to an “anti-oppression” rather 
than an “anti-subordination” principle.346 
For these reasons, the pretextualists would do better to direct 
their arguments toward a claim of disparate treatment:  a claim that 
judges applying the unconscionability defense sometimes intentionally 
discriminate against arbitration.347  In the anti-discrimination area, a 
 
338 See Hasnas, supra note 74, at 475-77. 
339 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976). 
340 Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339 n.20. 
341 See supra notes 299-02 and accompanying text. 
342 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995); South-
land Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14 (1984). 
343 Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1120 (1st Cir. 1989). 
344 S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2 (1924); Cohen & Dayton, supra note 17, at 283. 
345 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 112 (2001); see also Strausbaugh 
v. H & R Block Fin. Advisors, Inc., No. 05-001083, 2007 WL 3122257, at *4 (Ky. Ct. 
App. Oct. 26, 2007) (interpreting Circuit City as holding that the FAA preempts only 
state laws hostile to arbitration); Wilson, supra note 180, at 813. 
346 See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text. 
347 This is furthermore consistent with the pretextualists’ own suspicion of “hostili-
ty” and “disdain” in the way judges apply the unconscionability defense against arbitra-
tion.  See McGuinness & Karr, supra note 180, at 61; Randall, supra note 298, at 186; 
Riske, supra note 31, at 591. 
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plaintiff seeking to prove either an equal protection claim or a statu-
tory claim of disparate treatment need only establish intentional, un-
justified discrimination on the basis of the prohibited characteristic 
and adverse consequences resulting from it.  Proof of disparate out-
comes is, strictly speaking, neither necessary nor sufficient for this 
purpose.348  The upshot for pretextualists is that the disparate treat-
ment framework can help them avoid some of the problems inherent 
in making persuasive apples-to-apples comparisons between uncons-
cionability outcomes in arbitration and nonarbitration cases. 
The challenge, of course, is how to prove purposeful discrim-
ination.  Sometimes, a judge can scarcely conceal her distaste for 
arbitration.  In one case, Montana Supreme Court Justice Trieweiler 
went out of his way to describe the “total lack of procedural safe-
guards” in arbitration and to accuse the Paradigm of “subvert[ing] 
our system of justice as we have come to know it.”349  In another, a 
state judge described an arbitration clause between a consumer and a 
large national bank as “yet another vignette in the timeless and con-
stant effort by the haves to squeeze from the have nots even the last 
drop” and to “design new devices and definitions to . . . [satisfy] their 
unquenchable thirst for profits.”350  These statements raise a strong 
presumption of hostility toward arbitration, as several pretextualists 
have already noted.351  In most cases, however, there is no smoking 
gun evidence of purposeful discrimination. 
This is precisely where conceptual resources developed in the an-
ti-discrimination area, again, prove helpful.  Anti-discrimination law is 
keenly attuned to the historical realities of prejudice and the difficul-
 
348 See supra note 339 and accompanying text; infra note 367.  
349 Lombardi I, 886 P.2d 931, 940-41 (Mont. 1994) (Trieweiler, J., specially concur-
ring), vacated, 515 U.S. 1129 (1995).  
350 Lytle v. Citifinancial Servs., Inc., 810 A.2d 643, 658 n.8 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002), 
overruled on other grounds by Salley v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 925 A.2d 115, 129 (Pa. 
2007); see also Knepp v. Credit Acceptance Corp. (In re Knepp), 229 B.R. 821, 827 
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1999) (“The reality that the average consumer frequently loses 
his/her constitutional rights and right of access to the court . . . rises as a putrid odor 
which is overwhelming to the body politic.”). 
351 Randall and Bruhl have both made this point with reference to Justice Triewei-
ler’s remarks.  See Bruhl, supra note 168, at 1459-60; Randall, supra note 298, at 220-21.  
In other contexts, such obvious declarations of bias have been sufficient to prove 
purposeful discrimination on the part of a trial court judge.  For example, the Fourth 
Circuit found an equal protection violation where a district court judge stated during 
criminal sentencing that, although he was not supposed to sentence female defendants 
more leniently than male defendants, “I’m old fashioned enough I just don’t believe in 
punishing women who participate in a crime with the men on the same basis as a 
man.”  United States v. Maples, 501 F.2d 985, 986 (4th Cir. 1974). 
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ties inherent in proving discriminatory purpose.352  It has accordingly 
devised helpful evidentiary and burden-shifting frameworks that facili-
tate the inference of status-based discrimination.353 
Thus, the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine test in the statutory discrimi-
nation area raises a presumption of intentional discrimination in cases 
where all status-independent explanations for an adverse employment 
decision (such as the lack of job-related qualifications) can be ruled 
out.354  Similarly, in the equal protection context, the factors set forth 
in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.355 
help focus the factfinder’s inquiry on what the Court deems to be 
telltale indicia of intentional discrimination.  Examples of such factors 
include governmental decisions that (1) wreak extreme dispropor-
tionate impact on a particular group, (2) are preceded by an unusual 
sequence of events, or (3) are reached through departures from 
normal procedures or substantive rules.356  None of these factors, 
alone or in combination, suggests intentional discrimination based on 
suspect or quasi-suspect group membership any more than it suggests 
disorganization, neglect, or an aversion to rules.357  But the Arlington 
Heights framework permits the factfinder to infer intent nonetheless, 
in turn triggering heightened scrutiny, which has itself been described 
as an heuristic for “flushing out” improper motives capable of con-
cealment behind ostensibly valid reasons.358 
 
352 See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505-06 (2005); Foster, supra note 
335, at 1496-97. 
353 See Foster, supra note 335, at 1479 (discussing the role of historical context in 
the Court’s approach to disparate impact); Selmi, supra note 77, at 295 
(“[D]iscrimination law has long been treated as a unique area of civil litigation that 
requires proof structures and rules that are distinct from the rules and procedures that 
govern other civil disputes.”). 
354 See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981) (citing 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Greene, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).  The burden of pro-
duction then shifts to the defendant to disprove the inference by offering a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason.  If the defendant discharges this burden, the plaintiff has an 
opportunity to prove that the defendant’s explanation is a pretext.  See id. at 256; see 
also McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05. 
355 429 U.S. 252 (1977).  
356 See id. at 266-67 (identifying additional factors). 
357 See Selmi, supra note 77, at 304-05; cf. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of 
Our Categories:  A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportu-
nity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1181 (1995) (making the same point in the statutory dis-
crimination context). 
358 See ELY, supra note 139, at 146; see also City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 
U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (“[T]he purpose of strict scrutiny is to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate 
uses of race . . . .”). 
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The rationale for the inference of intentional discrimination made 
possible by these frameworks is that, given our collective history and 
expectations, erratic, arbitrary, or unexplained behavior that tends to 
disadvantage certain groups of persons is immediately suspicious.359  
Only with the force of this normative presumption—a presumption 
that makes sense only in connection with “suspect” or “quasi-suspect” 
classes—does proof of discriminatory purpose become an attainable 
goal.  To be sure, in the anti-discrimination area these frameworks 
have been partially undermined by subsequent legal developments and 
thus may not function in practice in quite the same way as they do in 
theory.  Nonetheless, the basic theory behind them is sound and can 
still be applied in helpful ways in the FAA preemption context. 
Distilling these insights, I propose the following test for determin-
ing whether a court has applied a general contract defense in a way 
that stands as an obstacle to the Paradigm’s anti-discrimination 
mandate:  First, the defense must be of a type that “provid[es] ‘the op-
portunity for discrimination.’”360  More than any other general contract 
defense, unconscionability meets this test.  Second, the court’s uncons-
cionability decision must rest on generalizations about arbitration’s in-
adequacy as a dispute resolution process,361 or must otherwise permit 
the inference that the decision, “‘if otherwise unexplained, [is] more 
likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors.’”362 
The opponent may defend the decision below either by disprov-
ing one of these preliminary factors (thereby denying the trial judge’s 
intent to discriminate) or by conceding intentional discrimination but 
offering a sound justification for it.363  In doing so, she may not simply 
“presume that arbitration in and of itself is inferior to a court pro-
ceeding”364 or otherwise rely on generalizations about arbitration.  
 
359 See Foster, supra note 335, at 1500, 1539-40; Selmi, supra note 77, at 297, 305-06. 
360 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 95 (1986) (quoting Whitus v. Georgia, 385 
U.S. 545, 552 (1967)); see also id. at 96 (observing that the practice must “permit[] 
‘those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate’” (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 
345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953))). 
361 See supra notes 119-49 and accompanying text. 
362 Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (quoting 
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)); see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 
93-96; Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-67 
(1977) (identifying numerous circumstantial factors from which a purpose to discri-
minate might be inferred). 
363 See supra notes 276-80 and accompanying text. 
364 McGuinness & Karr, supra note 180, at 78; cf. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98 (holding 
that a prosecutor may not rely on “assumptions, which arise solely from the jurors’ 
race” or on “general assertions” to the effect that she acted in good faith). 
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Instead, she must point to objective facts about the particular 
arbitration agreement at issue (or the arbitral process contemplated 
by it) to demonstrate unconscionability.  If the opponent fails to prof-
fer the required explanation or to offer a sound justification, the re-
viewing court would be required to conclude that hostility toward ar-
bitration motivated the application of the contract defense. 
In developing this test, I was influenced in part by the framework 
for proving intentional discrimination that the Court developed in 
Batson v. Kentucky.365  The context of Batson—discrimination by a 
prosecutor in the use of peremptory challenges—may seem far 
removed from disputes over arbitration clauses.  But because lower 
courts have applied the Batson framework to equal protection claims 
brought against judges, who in many states are responsible for the 
selection of grand juries,366 this line of cases represents the closest 
functional analog to the situation here, in which the issue is whether a 
trial judge has discriminated against arbitration in the application of a 
general rule of contract. 
In addition, Batson recognized that a “‘single invidiously discrim-
inatory governmental act’” is sufficient to trigger an equal protection 
violation; thus, the party claiming discrimination need not provide 
evidence of “‘other comparable decisions’” and may instead “rely[] 
solely on the facts concerning [juror] selection in his case.”367  This 
innovation helps steer the FAA preemption inquiry away from 
outcome-based comparisons to the real issue of the true (rather than 
pretextual) reasons why a court reaches a particular unconscionability 
 
365 See 476 U.S. at 96-98.  In the equal protection area, McClesky v. Kemp appears to 
have significantly undercut Batson.  See 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987).  Nonetheless, Batson 
still provides a useful model for decoding pretextual discrimination against arbitration 
in the unconscionability context.  
366 See, e.g., Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 F.2d 1215, 1222-23 (3d Cir. 1992) (describing 
the process of grand jury selection by a New Jersey judge). 
367 Batson, 476 U.S. at 95 (quoting Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 n.14).  This 
was Batson’s chief innovation.  It effectively relieved criminal defendants of the burden 
to prove that “‘in case after case, whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and 
whoever the defendant or the victim may be,’” the prosecutor had systematically struck 
jurors based on their protected-class status.  Id. at 91-92 (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 
380 U.S. 202, 223 (1965)).   
 In a related vein, the Second Circuit has held that a female employee could prevail 
on a gender-based § 1983 claim even though she had failed to produce evidence that 
similarly situated male employees were treated differently.  See Back v. Hastings on 
Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 121 (2d Cir. 2004).  “‘[T]he ultimate is-
sue,’” the court explained, “‘is the reasons for the individual plaintiff’s treatment, not 
the relative treatment of different groups within the workplace.’”  Id. (quoting Brown v. 
Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
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decision.  Finally, Batson involved discretionary decisionmaking 
(peremptory challenges) that, like the unconscionability doctrine, 
carries a potential for abuse. 
Several qualifications are in order.  First, the test should set a high 
bar.  If it is difficult to establish discriminatory intent in the context of 
race, it should be equally, if not more so, in the arbitration context.  
The stakes here are not nearly as high as they are in cases of invidious 
discrimination based on suspect or quasi-suspect classifications.  And 
although race “correlates so weakly with the legitimate characteristics 
for which it might be used as a proxy,”368 the same is not necessarily 
true for arbitration.369 
Second, because it would not be feasible or desirable to hold an 
evidentiary hearing or to voir dire the trial judge who made the initial 
unconscionability determination, the issue of whether the trial court 
applied a general contract defense against arbitration in a discrimina-
tory fashion should be treated as a question of law that may be de-
cided de novo based on the trial court record alone.370 
Reasonable minds can certainly disagree about the lines I have 
drawn.  As with the test put forward in Part III, I offer this test as a 
conversation starter rather than as a finished product.  For my 
purposes, the content of any proposed rule is less important than the 
latent considerations that the rule helps bring to the surface. 
D.  Application 
Several courts have held arbitration clauses presumptively un-
conscionable when they do not evince a “modicum of bilaterality”371 or 
 
368 Brest, supra note 114, at 11. 
369 See supra notes 329-34 and accompanying text. 
370 This is consistent with well-settled law to the effect that de novo review is ap-
propriate for federal preemption questions and for the interpretation of the intent 
behind legal instruments such as statutes or contracts.  See, e.g., City of Auburn v. Qwest 
Corp., 247 F.3d 966, 977 (9th Cir. 2001) (observing that because preemption is a ques-
tion of law, “[n]o further factual record would narrow or clarify that issue”), rev’d on 
other grounds, 260 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2001); Parks v. State, 247 P.3d 857, 859 (Wyo. 
2011) (“‘Statutory interpretation is a question of law.  Our paramount consideration is 
the legislature’s intent as reflected in the plain and ordinary meaning of the words 
used in the statute.’” (quoting Sorensen v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 234 P.3d 1233, 
1237 (Wyo. 2010))). 
371 Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 692 (Cal. 
2000); see also Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 2003).  The party defend-
ing the agreement may rebut the Armendariz presumption if it can prove a “business rea-
lit[y]” necessitating nonmutual terms.  See Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 692.   
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“mutuality of obligation.”372  A typical example is a clause that requires 
the adherent to arbitrate her claims but does not impose the same re-
quirement on the drafter.  Pretextualists argue that the requirement 
of mutuality is a ruse behind which judges hide their continuing hos-
tility toward arbitration.  They reason that nonmutual bargains are 
generally not considered unconscionable outside the arbitration con-
text and, moreover, that this fact standing alone proves discrimination 
against arbitration.373 
But there may be perfectly good reasons why nonmutual dispute 
resolution agreements should be deemed more unconscionable than 
nonmutual agreements about, say, sales terms.  For example, an arbi-
tration clause that provides for one party to select two out of three 
neutrals is much more likely to strike us as unfair than a sales term 
that provides for one party to shoulder two-thirds of the costs.  Un-
like existing approaches, therefore, the anti-discrimination model 
would require the pretextualists to make a threshold showing of in-
tentional hostility toward arbitration—aided, of course, by an evi-
dentiary framework of the sort I have proposed that would allow 
them to infer intentional disparate treatment from unexplained, in-
accurate, or unusual aspects of the court’s unconscionability ruling. 
As an illustration of how the anti-discrimination model might 
work in this context, consider the California Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services,374 a decision 
that remains controversial today.  In Armendariz, the court announced 
that “an arbitration agreement imposed in an adhesive context lacks 
basic fairness and mutuality if it requires one contracting party, but 
not the other, to arbitrate all claims.”375  It accordingly upheld the 
lower court’s unconscionability determination and refused to find the 
determination preempted by the FAA, reasoning that unconscionabil-
ity is part of the general law of contracts.  How would Armendariz be 
decided under a test of the sort I propose? 
The proponent—here, the employer-defendant—would have lit-
tle trouble establishing the first prong of my test because unconscio-
 
372 Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 66 F.3d 438, 451 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Lytle v. 
Citifinancial Servs., Inc., 810 A.2d 643, 663 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002), overruled on other 
grounds by Salley v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 925 A.2d 115, 129 (Pa. 2007); Iwen v. 
U.S. W. Direct, 977 P.2d 989, 996 (Mont. 1999). 
373 See McGuinness & Karr, supra note 180, at 82; Randall, supra note 298, at 207. 
374 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000). 
375 Id. at 694. 
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nability is susceptible to discriminatory application.376  Thus, the is-
sue turns on whether the court’s decision was based on biases or ge-
neralizations about arbitration, or whether there is something else 
about the totality of the circumstances that warrants an inference of 
unjustified discrimination.377 
One indication of bias is the court’s characterization of the arbi-
tration clause as “requir[ing]” or “obligat[ing]” the employees to arbi-
trate but relieving the employer from the same constraints.378  This 
characterization appears to mask a value judgment, for although the 
arbitration clause required the employees to arbitrate their claims, it 
also denied that same option to the employer.  Like the employees, 
the employer had no choice of dispute resolution options because the 
employees never agreed to arbitrate the employer’s claims, only their 
own.  Where each side has no option but to use one form of dispute 
resolution, the employer is no less “requir[ed]” or “obligat[ed]” to li-
tigate than the employees are to arbitrate—unless, of course, one pre-
sumes that arbitration is inherently undesirable or inadequate com-
pared with litigation.  As the pretextualists have noted, the holding in 
Armendariz appears to be based almost entirely assumptions about arbi-
tration’s inferiority as a dispute resolution forum.379 
Moreover, there are other telltale signs of hostility in the court’s 
opinion.  For example, the court did not bother to look at whether 
the parties’ particular arbitration clause was so one-sided as to 
“shock[] the conscience.”380  Instead, the court relied on what it per-
ceived as “the inherent shortcomings of arbitration—limited discov-
 
376 See supra note 360 and accompanying text. 
377 See supra note 362 and accompanying text. 
378 Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 691-92, 694; see also Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., 
265 F.3d 931, 940 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The arbitration clause in this case allowed Choice to 
bring its claims against Ticknor into state or federal court, yet forced Ticknor to submit 
all claims to binding arbitration at Choice’s headquarters in Maryland.” (emphasis 
added)); Iwen, 977 P.2d at 996 (“[I]t makes no sense for one party . . . to have the free-
dom to seek the remedy before a court of law, while the other party . . . is forced to seek 
the same remedy only through arbitration.” (emphasis added)). 
379 See Broome, supra note 180, at 41 (arguing that California courts are biased 
against arbitration); Burton, supra note 30, at 488-90 (arguing that Armendariz and oth-
er cases show bias against arbitration). 
380 2A LAWRENCE, supra note 319, § 2-302:27; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. b (1981) (describing an unconscionable contract as one “‘such 
as no man in his senses and not under delusion would make’” (quoting Hume v. United 
States, 132 U.S. 406, 411 (1889))).  Although the court went on to consider the limita-
tion-on-damages provision in the arbitration clause, it noted that this provision merely 
“compounded” the unconscionability of the clause.  Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 694. 
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ery, limited judicial review, limited procedural protections.”381  As we 
have seen, although it is a fair generalization that discovery and appel-
late review are not available in arbitration as they are in litigation, it 
would be a mistake to conclude that these shortcomings are necessari-
ly “inherent” in arbitration, or indeed that they are “shortcomings” at 
all.382  These common features of arbitration can be, and often have 
been, varied by agreement.383  Moreover, there is significant dissensus 
as to whether full-blown discovery is in fact so essential to fair and ef-
fective dispute resolution such that its unavailability should be consi-
dered a shortcoming rather than a virtue.384  The decision in Armenda-
riz was based solely on these and other suspect assumptions—
assumptions that the court frankly conceded were “disadvantages that 
may exist” for plaintiffs in arbitration.385 
At this point in the test, the opponent-employee would have the 
opportunity to refer to specific aspects of the Armendariz opinion or to 
facts in the record that tend either to dispel the biased assumptions im-
plicit in the court’s reasoning, or otherwise to justify the court’s un-
conscionability decision.  It is not sufficient simply to declare, as did the 
Armendariz court, that “[t]he application of [the unconscionability] 
principle to arbitration does not disfavor arbitration.”386  Nor would it 
be adequate to rely on generalized denials or conclusory statements.  
Given the facts of Armendariz, it appears unlikely that the opponent 
could successfully rebut the presumption of intentional discrimination. 
Under the test I propose, the result in Armendariz would not compel 
the same outcome in another controversial case from the California 
 
381 Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 691.  The court also relied on anecdotal evidence for the 
proposition that “courts and juries are viewed as more likely to adhere to the law and 
less likely than arbitrators to ‘split the difference’ between the two sides, thereby lower-
ing damages awards for plaintiffs.”  Id. at 693. 
382 See supra notes 143-49.  
383 See supra note 127. 
384 See, e.g., Javier H. Rubinstein, International Commercial Arbitration:  Reflections at the 
Crossroads of the Common Law and Civil Law Traditions, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 303, 304 (2004) 
(“It is difficult to overstate the horror with which parties and counsel outside the United 
States view the prospect of American-style discovery . . . .”); Edward F. Sherman, Transna-
tional Perspectives Regarding the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 56 J. LEGAL EDUC. 510, 517-
18 (2006) (discussing weaknesses of the American discovery process); Ralph K. Winter, 
In Defense of Discovery Reform, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 263, 264, 275-78 (1992) (discussing the 
need for and benefits of discovery reform).  See generally Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary 
Character of Civil Discovery:  A Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295 
(1978) (criticizing abusive discovery practices as costly and counterproductive to the 
search for truth in litigation).  
385 Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 692 (emphasis added). 
386 Id. at 693. 
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courts.  Like Armendariz, Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc. involved a nonmutual 
arbitration clause.387  Although the court found the clause to be uncon-
scionable, it did so for reasons that were not necessarily predicated on 
arbitration’s inferiority to litigation.  For example, the court found sev-
eral other features of the arbitration clause problematic, such as a limita-
tion on remedies, a shortened statute of limitations, and a waiver of de-
fective service.388  It concluded that the clause was “unconscionably one-
sided and unfair in numerous respects,” not just in the way it reserved 
access to the courts for only one party.389  Without more, these facts 
would be insufficient to raise a durable inference of discrimination. 
A variant of the nonmutual arbitration clause in Armendariz and 
Stirlen is one that gives the drafting party a choice of forums (arbitra-
tion or litigation) but restricts the adherent to only one (typically arbi-
tration).390  Here one might argue that the unilateral right to choose a 
forum after a dispute arises gives one party an unfair tactical advan-
tage over the other—an advantage that is so one-sided as to shock the 
conscience.  An unconscionability finding based on this rationale 
would not “necessarily express the impermissible view that arbitration 
is inferior to litigation.”391  Absent other facts, therefore, it too would 
not be preempted. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court’s FAA preemption jurisprudence is undeniably orga-
nized around an anti-discrimination principle—a principle that only 
requires the preemption of state laws that intentionally and unjustifia-
bly discriminate against arbitration agreements.  The best interpreta-
tion of that principle is that state laws singling out arbitration on their 
 
387 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 152 (Ct. App. 1997). 
388 Id. at 142-43. 
389 Id. at 159. 
390 See, e.g., Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 170 
(5th Cir. 2004) (“The cases do not necessarily express the impermissible view that arbi-
tration is inferior to litigation, for a choice of remedies is better than being limited to one 
forum.”); E-Z Cash Advance, Inc. v. Harris, 60 S.W.3d 436, 442 (Ark. 2001) (refusing to 
uphold an arbitration clause giving the drafter, but not the adherent, the option to sue in 
court or arbitration); State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 284 (W. Va. 2002) 
(refusing to uphold a contract where defendant “t[ied] substantively unconscionable ex-
culpatory and limitation of liability provisions in a form contract of adhesion”). 
391 Iberia Credit, 379 F.3d at 170.  Nonetheless, preemption might be proper if the 
unconscionability finding were shown to be based largely on negative assumptions 
about arbitration or were tainted with other indications of bias.  See, e.g., Dunlap, 567 
S.E.2d at 271, 280 n.12 (presuming that a sole arbitrator selected by an employer 
would be biased). 
ARAGAKI REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/13/2011  1:27 PM 
1304 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 1233 
face trigger at most a suspicion that they are based on improper pre-
conceptions about arbitration’s inferiority compared to litigation.  
Applications of general contract rules that rely on biases or generali-
zations about arbitration and that render arbitration agreements un-
enforceable are suspect for the same reason.  These are the ways in 
which I claim that arbitration deserves “suspect” status. 
Understanding arbitration’s “suspect” status makes possible a new, 
more robust approach to FAA preemption.  In this Article, I have at-
tempted to sketch the foundations of such an approach and to use it 
both to critique and offer solutions to two important problems in the 
Court’s existing preemption paradigm:  over- and underpreemption.  
But many questions remain to be answered and many more details 
need to be embellished before such an approach can earn a place in 
the pantheon of FAA preemption theories.392  This is just one of many 
possible starting points for what I hope will become a fertile avenue of 
scholarship and debate. 
 
 
392 I pursue some of these questions in my forthcoming article.  See Aragaki, supra 
note 27. 
